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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the proper role of comparative law in the jurisprudence of 
American courts has become a hotly debated and controversial topic. The 
question was brought to the forefront of the legal community’s attention 
following a number of United States Supreme Court decisions, perhaps most 
notably in Atkins v. Virginia1 and Roper v. Simmons,2 rulings that addressed 
the constitutionality of administering the death penalty to mentally retarded and 
juvenile defendants. In both decisions, the Court was divided on whether to 
regard foreign laws and practices as indicative of an evolving standard of 
decency when determining whether a punishment should be considered “cruel 
and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  
Those who oppose reference to comparative law have argued that the use 
of foreign opinions to interpret domestic law unduly imposes foreign “moods, 
fads, or fashions” upon Americans.3 Since laws are enacted by democratically 
elected representatives, the experience and legislation of other jurisdictions is 
immaterial and should carry little, if any, authority in their interpretation.4 
Critics contend that using foreign law to determine the proper scope of 
American legislation may award judges a legislative or treaty-ratifying power, 
an authority clearly reserved by the Constitution for other branches of 
government.5 Judges who have used comparative law in formulating their 
opinions have been accused of “cherry picking” foreign law that supports their 
opinions; they have been charged with “sophistry” and disguising their personal 
and political preferences behind a mask of international consensus.6  
Proponents of comparative law have countered that although foreign law 
should not bind American courts, surveying international practices and 
exploring the approaches of other nations may lend American courts useful 
insight into common problems and affirm their convictions about correct 
1. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  
2. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  
3. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of 
certiorari); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 
321-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  
4. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
5. Id. at 622.  
6. Id. at 627.  
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solutions. As Justice Kennedy has said, “The opinion of the world community, 
while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant 
confirmation for our own conclusions.”7 Others have emphasized comparative 
law’s crucial role in prompting us to challenge the necessity and wisdom of 
doctrines to which we have grown accustomed and that we might view as 
unchangeable. Foreign law reminds us that other, and perhaps better, solutions 
might exist elsewhere.8 True, supporters allow, the citation of foreign law may 
be prone to abuse, but such risks are neither unique to nor inherent in the use of 
comparative law.9 
Despite considerable attention given to the proper role of comparative law 
in interpreting domestic law, legal scholarship in the United States has 
concentrated primarily on the use of foreign law by American courts. But 
especially for those who have emphasized the relevance of foreign experience 
in addressing common legal dilemmas, examining the approach of foreign 
courts toward comparative law is an equally informative and relevant inquiry. 
The use of comparative law by courts is by no means a uniquely American 
practice; the United States in fact does relatively little of it in comparison to 
other nations. This Note, therefore, takes a different course: it focuses primarily 
on the role played by comparative law in the jurisprudence of a foreign 
jurisdiction—one that frequently relies upon comparative law—and the 
problems this practice has bred. That is, it offers a comparative angle to the use 
of comparative law.  
More specifically, I offer a case study of a recent decision of the Israeli 
Supreme Court in Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor,10 which dealt with 
the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. For many reasons the Israeli 
Supreme Court has often relied heavily on comparative law when formulating 
its own opinions. However, despite frequent citation of foreign authorities by 
Israeli courts, this practice has largely escaped controversy. Cases making key 
use of comparative law therefore abound, as do complications to which this 
practice may lead. Examining the Israeli use of comparative law also helps 
underscore some of the differences between the objections raised in the United 
States and concerns that exist in other countries, highlighting those that are 
uniquely American and pointing out why the United States may have less to 
fear from foreign law than some critics suggest.  
The Note also addresses a debate closely related to the controversy 
surrounding the use of comparative law: the possibility and desirability of legal 
7. Id. at 578.   
8. See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE 
L.J. 1225, 1227 (1999).  
9. See Mark Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better Than Knowing More? Unpacking 
the Controversy over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 
1297-98 (2006).  
10. CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] (not yet published), 
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/98/210/051/n21/98051210.n21.pdf.  
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transplants. Opponents of legal transplanting have argued that the deep ties 
between legal rules and the culture and traditions in which they develop often 
make it difficult or unwise to transplant the legal rules of one jurisdiction into 
the judicial system of another. Pierre Legrand, one of the most prominent 
critics of legal transplants, warns that transplanted doctrines often fail to 
maintain their original meaning in a new environment and that therefore courts 
should borrow cautiously and with limited expectations.11 He and others have 
criticized the work of “comparativist transplanters,” who through the citation of 
foreign doctrines create a sense of false consensus regarding legal rules. Critics 
argue that such formal citation of foreign law often overlooks the unique 
character and operation of a doctrine in its original setting, blurring in the 
process the distinction between self and other. In contrast, proponents of legal 
transplants emphasize the important role foreign doctrines have played in legal 
development since time immemorial.12 According to Alan Watson and other 
scholars, it would be impossible to imagine a modern legal system that did not 
borrow or was not influenced in significant ways by laws originating 
elsewhere. Legal rules are readily transplanted, they say, and the links between 
law and culture, history, economics, and language are easily exaggerated.  
In the hunt for a test case to add substance to this debate, I offer an in-
depth analysis of Israel’s exclusionary rule to assess the challenges of 
translating and transplanting doctrines across borders and cultures. My choice 
to focus on evidence law stems from the particular challenges that its 
transplantation poses.13 The strong ties between rules of evidence and the 
broader institutional context in which they are administered suggest that 
evidence law can provide unique insight into the dangers of legal borrowing 
and the use of comparative law.14 The exclusionary rule,15 a doctrine 
intimately linked to judicial structure, offers a particularly illustrative test 
11. See Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants’, 4 MAASTRICHT J. 
EUR




, and the 
alloc
the accuracy of fact-
findi
. & COMP. L. 111 (1997).   
12. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
22-24 (2d ed. 1993); Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and European 
TRONIC J. COMP. L., Dec. 2000, http://www.ejcl.org/44/art44-2.html. 
13. See Mirjan Damaska, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Tr
rican and Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839 (1997).  
14. I allude here to factors such as the identity of the fact finder, lay or professional, 
whether the court is unitary or bifurcated, the temporal organization of proceedings
ation of procedural control between the judge and the parties. See id. at 840. 
15. I use the term “exclusionary rule” in this Note as a shorthand for the exclusion of 
evidence obtained illegally (through the violation of rules governing search and seizure for 
example). This is only part of the greater category of exclusionary rules and more 
specifically, of the many extrinsic exclusionary rules, i.e., rules that reject probative 
information for the sake of values unrelated to the pursuit of truth (such as the protection of 
defendants’ rights). Other such extrinsic exclusionary rules are those which address 
privileges. Intrinsic exclusionary rules are those designed to enhance 
ng. See MIRJAN DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 12-17 (1997).  
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case.16 Hence, in Part I, I examine the Issacharov decision, in which the Israeli 
Supreme Court redefined the exclusionary rule in what the Court proclaimed to 
be a groundbreaking decision. Was the decision in fact as revolutionary as it 
suggests? The Court’s considerable, and often questionable, reliance upon 
comparative law may have misled the Court to see an unremarkable case as 
groundbreaking.  
Issacharov is only the most recent attempt by the Israeli Supreme Court to 
transplant foreign exclusionary rules into Israel. In Part II, I provide a historical 
look at four stages in the development of the exclusionary rule in Israeli 
evidence law to further illustrate the inherent difficulties of legal transplanting. 
That Part explores the Israeli Supreme Court’s ongoing struggle to define and 
translate “admissibility,” a term which developed primarily in bifurcated jury 
systems, into Israel’s unitary judiciary. During different eras in Israeli history 
admissibility has connoted different aspects of the common law term, yet 
without capturing its full and true essence.  
Part III addresses the risks of treating foreign law as precedent and the 
dangers of legal emulation. I ask why the Israeli Supreme Court has relied so 
heavily upon the common law in shaping Israel’s evidence rules, despite the 
fundamental differences between Israel and other common law jurisdictions.17  
Finally, Part IV evaluates the rhetorical role of comparative law as a tool 
for legitimizing judicial innovation. I discuss how comparative law can be 
(mis)used to create a sense of international consensus concerning an issue 
highly debated within a jurisdiction. I consider how comparative law can 
bolster the power of courts to “revolutionize” and how it served such functions 
in Issacharov. 
I. EXCLUDING ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE IN ISRAEL: THE ISSACHAROV 
DECISION 
In May 2006, the Israeli Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Issacharov,18 awarding Israeli courts the discretion to exclude illegally 
obtained evidence. The decision was hailed by many as “a revolution in Israeli 
evidence law.”19 Rafael Issacharov, a private in the Israel Defense Forces 
16. On the links between exclusion and bifurcation and why “[t]he unitary structure of 
Continental courts . . . bedevils the employment of extrinsic exclusionary rules—such as . . . 
thos




e rejecting improperly obtained confessions,” see id. at 49.  
17. Legal scholars often link the development of the unique Anglo-American rules of 
evidence to lay adjudication and the need to protect lay fact finders from potentially 
unreliable information. See MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE 
AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROAC
RGE ISHER, EVIDENCE 1-2 (2002).  
18. CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] (not ye
lable at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/98/210/051/n21/98051210.n21.pdf.  
19. See Efrat Porscher, Illegally Obtained Confessions May Be Excluded, NRG, May 
4, 2006, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/170/923.html; Tal Rosner, The Supreme Court 
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(IDF), had been arrested for absence without leave. Entering a military prison, 
he was strip-searched and marijuana was found in his underwear. Issacharov 
was taken for interrogation but was not warned of his right to an attorney. 
During this interrogation, he provided the Military Police with a urine sample 
that indicated previous drug use, and he admitted to prior possession and use of 
marijuana. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that Issacharov’s confession 
and the physical evidence he provided should be excluded because the 
defendant was not informed of his right to an attorney. The defendant was 
acquitted of three counts of prior use and possession and convicted only for 
possession of the marijuana found on him.20 
The opinion of the Court in Issacharov distinguished the new doctrine, 
which gave courts the discretion to exclude evidence, from the old doctrine 
established in 1978 in Meiri v. Israel.21 Under Meiri courts were able to reduce 
the weight awarded to illegally obtained evidence—and in some cases even 
give such evidence no weight at all—but could not exclude it.22 According to 
the Issacharov Court, the creation of an exclusionary rule for illegally obtained 
evidence should be viewed as part of the larger “Constitutional Revolution” 
that has swept Israel since the passage of Basic Law: Human Dignity and 
Liberty in 1992. The law created a new balance between crime control and due 
process, leading to a greater protection of the defendant’s procedural rights. 
This protection translated into the greater power and willingness of courts to 
exclude illegally obtained evidence, not merely diminish its weight.23  
Comparative law played an important role in the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Issacharov, both as a basis for the Court’s authority to create an 
 
Rules that Confession Without a Defense Attorney Present is Inadmissible, YNET, May 4, 
2006, available at http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3246887,00.html; Yuval Yoaz, 
The Supreme Court: Courts May Exclude Evidence Obtained Illegally, HAARETZ, May 5, 
2006, available at http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=712770. 
The headnotes introducing the case in the Nevo database (which is comparable to Lexis or 
Westlaw) characterize Issacharov as “a revolutionary precedent which adopts the 
exclusionary rule into the Israeli legal system. In this case, a confession obtained before the 
detainee was given the right to consult with an attorney was excluded.” Nevo Database, 
http://www.nevo.co.il/serve/home/it/titleslawlink.asp?build=2&System=1&Exec=&cpq=&P
rocNum=5121&ProcYear=98&Process=%D7%A2%D7%A4&lawlink=11 (last visited April 
6, 2008).  
 However, there are also those who have expressed skepticism about how revolutionary 
Issacharov really is. See Ron Shapira, Not Such Big News: The Decision to Exclude Illegally 
Obtained Evidence Promises More than It Can Deliver, HAARETZ, May 9, 2006, available at 
http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=713879&contrassID=2&subC
ontrassID=3&sbSubContrassID=0.  
20. Issacharov [2006] § 82.   
21. CrimA 559/77 Meiri v. State  [1978] IsrSC 32(2) 180.  
22. Although Israeli courts had the power to diminish the weight of evidence to zero 
under Meiri, this authority was rarely exercised. See Eliahu Harnon, Illegally Obtained 
Evidence: A Comparative Survey, in 2 STUDIES IN HONOR OF JUSTICE MOSHE LANDAU 983, 
1021 (Aharon Barak & Elinoar Mazuz eds., 1995).  
23. Issacharov [2006] §§ 47, 54.  
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 rule through judicial fiat, sometimes followed later 
by l
illegally,28 and the Canadian and English models, which emphasize exclusion’s 
 
exclusionary rule and in determining the scope of the new doctrine. When 
addressing the anticipated criticism that establishing an exclusionary rule 
should be left to the Israeli parliament, the Court turned to “legal systems that 
are similar to our own.”24 It showed that even in the absence of explicit 
legislative authorization, the United States, England, and Australia all 
developed an exclusionary
egislative approval.25 
The Supreme Court also relied upon comparative law in formulating the 
proper scope of the exclusionary rule, turning again to a series of “legal 
systems that are similar to our own,” namely common law jurisdictions.26 The 
Court first examined the primary objectives served by exclusion in different 
jurisdictions.27 It distinguished between the American model, which 
concentrates primarily on deterring the police from obtaining evidence 
24. See Issacharov [2006] §§ 40, 50, 55. 
25. Id. § 50. The Israeli Supreme Court cited Kuruma v. The Queen, [1955] A.C. 197  
(P.C.) (E. Afr.), as establishing the rule later adopted in England in Section 78 of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and Bunning v. Cross, (1978) 141 C.L.R. 54, as the 
antecedent of Section 138 of the Australian Uniform Evidence Act 1995. Even though the 
Court in Issacharov does not state so specifically, it appears to be relying on dictum from 
Kuruma in which the Lords stated that “[n]o doubt in a criminal case the judge always has a 
discretion to disallow evidence if the strict rules of admissibility would operate unfairly 
against an accused.” Kuruma, [1955] A.C. at 204. However, the evidence in Kuruma was 
ultimately not excluded, with Lord Goddard stating that “[i]n their Lordships’ opinion the 
test to be applied in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to 
the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible and the court is not concerned with how the 
evid  
tled “Models for the Exclusion of Illegally 
Obtained ence: A Comparative View”).  
, J., dissenting)). A similar 
view
t of what is in fact a single governmental action prohibited by the terms of the 
ence was obtained.” Id. at 203. 
26. See Issacharov [2006] § 55 (enti
 Evid
27. Id.  
28. The characterization of the American exclusionary rule as focused solely on 
deterrence is itself highly questionable; at the very least, the matter has been under debate 
within the U.S. Supreme Court and there is strong evidence that other factors have been 
considered as well. Justice Clark’s majority opinion in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), 
cited judicial integrity as one of the rationales behind the exclusionary rule. He quoted with 
agreement the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead, stating, “Our government 
is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its 
example. . . . If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites 
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.” Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (citing 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis
 was expressed by Justice Brennan in 1984:  
Because seizures are executed principally to secure evidence, and because such evidence generally 
has utility in our legal system only in the context of a trial supervised by a judge, it is apparent that 
the admission of illegally obtained evidence implicates the same constitutional concerns as the 
initial seizure of that evidence. Indeed, by admitting unlawfully seized evidence, the judiciary 
becomes a par
Amendment.   
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 933 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
The role of deterrence in excluding evidence can be tied to a broader question of whether 
exclusion is a personal constitutional right of the aggrieved or an outside safeguard designed 
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role in protecting the reputation of the judicial system and the fairness of the 
process.29 According to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
evidence should be excluded if its admission would “bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute.”30 In England evidence can be excluded if it will have 
“such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought 
not to admit it.”31 
The Israeli Supreme Court went on to distinguish between backward-
looking remedies, meant to “erase” the damage caused by the illegal action, and 
forward-looking remedies aimed at avoiding future injustice caused by 
admitting such evidence against the defendant at trial.32 The former was 
attributed to the American approach and the latter to the other legal systems 
cited.33 From these two distinctions flowed a third: automatic exclusion as 
opposed to discretionary exclusion, with the Court choosing the latter as the 
most appropriate model for the Israeli legal system.34  
The Court illustrated three groups of considerations that might bear on a 
trial judge’s decision to exercise her discretion to exclude evidence.35 The first 
group dealt with the nature and severity of the illegal act itself. The trial judge 
could consider whether the illegal act was marginal and technical or 
fundamental; whether it was intentional; whether extenuating circumstances 
could justify the police behavior (for example, whether the police acted to 
prevent evidence destruction); and whether there was a ready way to obtain the 
evidence legally, a factor that weighs toward exclusion. Finally, the trial judge 
may consider whether the police would have obtained the evidence had it not 
been for the use of illegal means.36 
The second group of considerations addressed credibility; the Court 
examined the influence that the illegal means might have had upon the 
reliability of the evidence obtained, distinguishing primarily between 
testimonial and physical evidence.37 Finally, the third group of considerations 
involved the balancing that courts must conduct between the social advantages 
 
to deter those who might infringe it. The question remains controversial and some have 
argued that post-Warren Court decisions have emphasized the role of deterrence rather than 
other competing considerations. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
REGULATION OF POLICE INVESTIGATION 544-46 (3d ed. 2002). Nevertheless, as illustrated by 
Justice Brennan’s opinion, some post-Warren Court rulings have underscored other policy 
considerations such as judicial integrity and noncomplicity in unlawful interrogation. 
29. Issacharov [2006] §§ 57-59.  
30. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 
11, § 24(2) (U.K.). 
31. See Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 78(1) (Eng.). 
32. Issacharov [2006] § 55.  
33. Id. § 56-59.  
34. Id. § 60. 
35. Id. §§ 69-74.  
36. Id. § 70.  
37. Id. § 71.  
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ral the evidence in securing a conviction, the less likely exclusion 
would be.38  
A.  Issacharov and Meiri: Has Anything Really Changed?   
ad failed to abide by legal 
guid
xcluding evidence and giving it no weight in a unitary court 
system?42 
 
and disadvantages of excluding the evidence—the more severe the crime and 
the more cent
Issacharov was described by the Israeli Supreme Court as a significant 
departure from previous precedents and particularly from the doctrine 
established in 1978 in Meiri v. Israel.39 Under Meiri,40 courts could not 
exclude illegally obtained evidence, but could decide to give the evidence little 
or no weight. Like Issacharov, Meiri also addressed the infringement of the 
right to counsel. The police failed to summon Moshe Meiri’s attorney to a 
photo identification. Although the court in Meiri deemed the witness’s 
identification of the defendant to be completely reliable, the Supreme Court 
decided to give the evidence no weight whatsoever. The Court ruled that police 
failure to comply with the law could reduce the weight of the evidence 
obtained, and may even result (as it did in this instance) in awarding such 
evidence no weight at all, leading to the acquittal of the defendant. Meiri came 
after a series of incidents in which the police h
elines and paid no heed to the Supreme Court’s repeated warnings.41 
Reviewing the ruling in Meiri, one must wonder: is Issacharov a 
significant departure, or is the difference primarily semantic? In Israel’s unitary 
judiciary, in which judges engage in both fact-finding and legal determinations, 
the differences between the Meiri doctrine of “admissible, but without weight” 
and Issacharov’s “discretionary exclusion” are all but self-evident. Let us first 
consider how alike the two doctrines are in practice: under both doctrines, legal 
determinations concerning the admissibility of evidence are made by the same 
person who engages in fact-finding—the judge. The judge examines the 
content of the contested evidence before determining its fate; under neither 
doctrine is exclusion automatic even if the court determines that the rights of 
the defendant have been infringed; that is, under both doctrines, the trial judge 
retains discretion over the fate of the evidence. What, then, are the differences 
between e
38. Id. § 72.  
39. Id. §§ 39, 42-43, 54.  
40. CrimA 559/77 Meiri v. Israel [1978] IsrSC 32(2) 180.  
41. See CrimA 260/78 Suliman v. Attorney General [1979] IsrSC 33(2) 207; CrimA 
559/77 Meiri v. State [1978] IsrSC 32(2) at 182; CrimA 161/77 Zuher v. State [1978] IsrSC 
32(1) 327.   
42. For a discussion of why the term “exclusion” is itself problematic in unitary courts, 
see DAMASKA, supra note 15, at 47-52. Damaska points out that in unitary systems the fact 
finder cannot entirely erase the impressions of inadmissible evidence to which he has been 
exposed. Therefore, exclusion in such contexts is limited; the most that can be expected is 
that the judge not base a written opinion upon inadmissible evidence. Id. Damaska’s 
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The Supreme Court in Issacharov encountered some difficulty when 
attempting to distinguish the existing doctrine from the new one.43 The Court 
gave no hint of the practical consequences of the change in doctrine. It 
conceded that the two doctrines would often lead to the same result, yet 
neglected to provide a single example in which the two approaches would lead 
to different outcomes.44 Moreover, before Issacharov was decided, some legal 
scholars had indicated that the two doctrines were de facto commensurate and 
would produce identical results.45 In fact, in Issacharov itself the two doctrines 
could have led to the same outcome, and Private Issacharov could have been 
acquitted of marijuana possession and use even under the Meiri doctrine: the 
Court could have given no weight to his confession to prior use and to the urine 
sample he provided, leaving the prosecution with too little evidence to prove 
the crimes.46 
B.  Distinguishing Admissibility from Weight in Bifurcated and Unitary Courts 
Although the distinction between admissibility and weight had no 
significance in the Israeli context, it does carry great importance in bifurcated 
courts. In most common law systems cited by the Israeli Supreme Court in 
Issacharov, the distinction between a question of admissibility and one of 
weight was critical. It determined who decided the fate of the evidence—judge 
or jury. Whereas admissibility is determined by the judge, weight is the 
province of juries; if a judge excludes the evidence, the jury can no longer 
determine its weight. In motions to suppress illegally obtained evidence, the 
result of exclusion is that the jury never has access to the questionable evidence 
at all. In England and the United States, suppression motions are held, 
whenever possible, outside the hearing of the jury, which never even learns of 
the existence of such evidence.47 In the United States, these hearings are often 
observations are equally applicable to bench trials in common law jurisdictions as they are in 
unitary civil law systems. However, the question of whether exclusion can be effectively 
achie  e scope of this Note.  
 [2006] § 74. 
egally obtained evidence; it appears that the Court added the possibility to 
“exc
ved in a unitary court is beyond th
43. See Issacharov
44. Id.  
45. See Harnon, supra note 22, at 1021.  
46. Furthermore, in at least one sense Issacharov is narrower than Meiri and is 
contained in the Meiri doctrine. Issacharov gives the court the possibility to admit or exclude 
evidence, in an all-or-nothing manner, whereas Meiri allowed the court a broader range of 
sanctions if it found that illegal means were used: it can admit the evidence but reduce its 
weight. See CrimA 559/77 Meiri v. State [1978] IsrSC 32(2) at 182. However, it appears that 
Issacharov did not reverse Meiri. Therefore, courts maintain their power to discount the 
weight of ill
lude.” 
47. See FED. R. EVID. 104(c) (“Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all 
cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall 
be so conducted when the interests of justice require, or when an accused is a witness and so 
requests.”). Mueller and Kirkpatrick observe that “[d]efense requests to exclude confessions 
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conducted before a jury is even impaneled.48 Hence, in bifurcated jury settings, 
the distinction between admissibility and weight is significant. In Israel, which 
does not employ juries, the distinction does not carry similar ramifications. 
Although Israel does not employ juries, there are a number of ways in 
which the Israeli Supreme Court could have given substance to the new 
doctrine of “exclusion” as distinguished from the old doctrine of “no weight” in 
a unitary system. First, in an effort to maintain the fact finder’s ignorance 
toward the excluded evidence, the Court could have ordered that a different 
judge rule on preliminary motions to suppress evidence on constitutional 
grounds.49 Another possibility would be to limit motions to suppress to proving 
the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of the evidence (e.g., the behavior 
of the police interrogators when obtaining the confession), without examining 
the substance of the contested evidence. Some courts in the United States have 
followed such practice in bench trials when determining the voluntariness of a 
confession.50 But as we have seen, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the 
decision to exclude must be based in part upon the effect of the illegal means 
on the content of the evidence obtained; to make such a determination, the 
court must be allowed to examine the content of the evidence as well and 
cannot satisfy itself by examining only the means through which it was 
obtained. 
The Court also could have given substance to the distinction between 
exclusion and weight by ruling that certain facts, such as a failure to warn the 
as involuntary, and motions to suppress evidence on other constitutional grounds, are 
typically made before trial . . . and resolved before a jury is impaneled.” 1 CHRISTOPHER B. 
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 1:37 (3d ed. 2007). In England 
these determinations are also typically conducted in the absence of the jury. Furthermore, in 
England, if a judge has admitted such evidence and later realizes that it should not have 
admitted it, this can be sufficient grounds to dismiss the jury. See ARCHBOLD: CRIMINAL 
PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE 1578, 1603, 1606 (P.J. Richardson ed., 2005).  
48.  1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 47.  
49. As a matter of practice, Israeli courts do so in pretrial arrests: the judge who 
considers the grounds for pretrial custody cannot rule on guilt, since some of the evidence to 
which he is exposed (e.g., hearsay, prior convictions) are inadmissible at trial. See HAYA 
SANDBERG, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 98 (1996).  
50. See 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 47, at § 1:37. The authors note that 
“[t]here is strength in this view, since confessions can be unusually potent in persuasive 
force and they merit special attention.” On the other hand they note that “judges inevitably 
hear much evidence ultimately excluded, and the presence of constitutional issues does not 
itself mean they cannot perform in a dual capacity, and some cases have been less concerned 
on this point.” As I point out later, the former approach was adopted in Israel during the 
1960s in the Yassin case. Generally, such a procedure is applied in Israel when determining 
whether a confession is free and voluntary: Israeli courts conduct a “trial within a trial” to 
determine the matter and, at least historically, were not supposed to examine the substance of 
the confession when ruling on its admissibility. Nevertheless, court practice has evolved over 
the years and courts today are more likely to examine the content of the confession during 
the trial within a trial when ruling on its voluntary nature, in a manner that may “poison the 
judges mind.” See George C. Gebbie & Dan Bein, ‘Trial Within A Trial’ in Scotland and 
Israel, 10 EUR. J. CRIME CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 253, 264 (2002).  
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defendant of his rights, would result in automatic exclusion.51 This constraint 
on judicial discretion would have moved the doctrine a step away from Meiri.52 
However, the Court in Issacharov preferred to retain full discretion, providing 
only general (and often vague and counterintuitive) guidelines as to what 
circumstances would lead to inadmissibility.  
II. LOST IN TRANSLATION: ADMISSIBILITY IN ISRAELI COURTS THROUGHOUT 
THE DECADES 
From a practical standpoint, the Issacharov decision introduced little 
innovation into the Israeli legal system. Why, then, was the Supreme Court so 
convinced it was spearheading a revolution? As we shall see in this Part, 
Issacharov was the result of an ongoing attempt within the Israeli judiciary to 
translate the legal terms admissibility and weight from common law 
jurisdictions into Israeli law. The Court proceeded on the assumption that these 
terms could convey the same meaning in Israel that they held in the many 
common law jurisdictions that were cited in Issacharov. In law much like in 
literature, however, literal translations do not always capture the essence of the 
original; concepts and doctrines are often lost in translation. As Pierre Legrand 
has warned, “legal transplants” often emphasize the bare propositional 
statement borrowed from another jurisdiction, while overlooking the true and 
deeper meaning of the adopted rule.53 Mirjan Damaska and others have pointed 
out the particular perils of legal transplants in the field of evidence.54 The 
history leading up to Issacharov illustrates these dangers and the fraught task of 
translating evidentiary rules and terminology from one legal system into 
another. 
Therefore, this Part is dedicated to analyzing Israel’s attempts throughout 
the decades to translate evidentiary rules from other legal systems. It surveys 
four stages of development in the meaning of admissibility in relation to the 
exclusionary rule: the British Mandate era, when admissibility and weight 
connoted the distinction between law and fact respectively; the 1960s, when 
admissibility was regarded as a separate procedural stage in the examination of 
evidence; the 1970s, when admissibility came to connote rigid rules as opposed 
to the more discretionary weight standards; and finally, admissibility as a more 
51. This is the case in Germany. For example, evidence obtained through brutality or 
deceit must be excluded, whereas other violations leave the courts with discretion whether to 
exclude the evidence or not. See Craig M. Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1032, 1034 (1983); Harnon, supra note 22, at 1007.  
52. My purpose is not to advocate such an automatic exclusionary rule; rather, this 
possibility is presented to demonstrate how in the Israeli institutional context the term 
“exclusion” could have been distinguished from the Meiri “no weight” doctrine. 
53. See Legrand, supra note 11, at 114-15. 
54. See Damaska, supra note 13. For a discussion of the difficulties of comparative 
procedure, see John H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United 
States, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 545, 551-54 (1995). 
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severe sanction (when compared to weight) for dealing with police misconduct 
and abuse.55 After analyzing the complex meaning of admissibility in Israeli 
law, I will discuss how these shifting meanings, coupled with developments 
abroad, helped shape the Issacharov decision and how they led the Court to 
conclude that it was revolutionizing Israeli evidence law. 
A.  The British Mandate over Palestine: Admissibility as a Legal Standard 
The leading precedent concerning exclusion of illegally obtained evidence 
during the British Mandate over Palestine was the 1942 Berkovitz case, in 
which the Court excluded the confessions of four defendants because the police 
had not properly warned them of their right to remain silent.56 The four 
defendants, all constables, were charged with theft of tin from the Royal 
Engineers’ Store Base Depot. After hearing the initial account of the first 
defendant, the police interrogator informed him that it would be “better for him 
to tell the truth,”57 while informing all four defendants that they “are entitled to 
give evidence before [him] or in Court.”58 In the Supreme Court’s opinion, 
both actions infringed the defendants’ right to silence.59 The Court held that 
although the confessions seemed reliable, “[t]he question as to whether or not a 
confession is true is utterly immaterial when considering its admissibility”60  
and excluded them.  
One of the Supreme Court’s main dilemmas in Berkovitz was how to apply 
jury-based rules of admissibility in a judicial system that did not employ juries. 
The Court explained that in England, when deciding the admissibility of a 
confession alleged to have been obtained illegally, the judge engaged in the 
finding of both fact and law; he determined the circumstances under which the 
confession was obtained (fact) and whether it should still be regarded as “free 
and voluntary” (law). If the evidence was admitted, the jury then decided what 
weight to attach to it, depending on whether the jury found the evidence 
reliable.61   
However, in Palestine, where there were no juries, the judge would rule on 
all matters, including the weight of the confession. Therefore, different 
55. Anglo-American law includes many of these distinctions between admissibility 
and weight: the distinction between law and fact, the separate procedural and sequential 
determination of the two, and the maintaining of the fact finder’s ignorance of the content of 
evidence deemed inadmissible. However, the Israeli definition of admissibility has placed 
emphasis on particular distinctions at different periods, thus leading to inconsistencies. 
56. CrimA 155/42 Berkovitz v. Attorney General [1942] 9 Palestine L. Reps. 654.  
57. Id. at 659. 
58. Id. at 661. 
59. Interestingly, the Court excluded the evidence even though the defendants were 
constables, who presumably would have been aware of their right to remain silent. 
60. CrimA 155/42 Berkovitz v. Attorney General [1942] 9 Palestine L. Reps. at 661 
(emphasis added). 
61. Id. at 657-58. 
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distinctions between admissibility and weight had to be drawn. The Court ruled 
that “admissibility” must no longer include the factual inquiry into the 
circumstances of the interrogation (as it would in England), but should be 
strictly a question of the legal standard applied.62 For example, if it had been 
established that the defendant was not warned of his right to remain silent (a 
factual determination), the admissibility question would be whether from a 
legal standpoint such failure to warn should trigger exclusion of the evidence.  
As a consequence, whereas an appellate court would be unlikely to 
determine the weight of a confession or the factual circumstances surrounding 
the interrogation, “admissibility is eminently a matter with which a Court of 
Appeal not only may, but should interfere if, in their opinion, the wrong tests 
have been applied.”63 As we can see, the term admissibility was defined by the 
Court narrowly, as the legal standard applied to exclusion of evidence, while all 
factual determinations, both those pertaining to the circumstances of the 
interrogation and those concerning the reliability of the evidence, were beyond 
the scope of admissibility. During this period, admissibility in Palestine was 
only part of the admissibility test applied in England. 
B.  The 1960s: Admissibility as a Separate Procedural Step 
In many regards, the first years of Israeli statehood signify an effort to 
break away from the past, to reevaluate the laws implemented by the British, 
and to reexamine their applicability and desirability in the newly established 
state. The treatment of the exclusionary rule by Israeli courts during these years 
fits this broader trend: courts viewed the British rules as too rigid, leading to 
exclusion of perfectly reliable evidence due to “mere technicalities” such as a 
failure to warn the defendant of his right to silence.64 During these early years 
of statehood, therefore, the courts raised the bar for exclusion and ruled that 
evidence would be excluded only if there were doubts concerning its 
reliability—an assessment that turned primarily upon a factual determination 
that the illegal means used to obtain the confession may have prompted an 
innocent defendant to confess. It grew unclear what role legal determinations 
would have in admissibility rulings, as reliability became the only relevant 
factor. Appellate courts now had little role in second-guessing the treatment of 
illegally obtained evidence by lower courts, since the determination was 
62. Id. at 655, 657-58. 
63. Id. at 658. 
64. See, e.g., CrimA 20/49 Hadi v. Attorney General [1949] IsrSC 3(1) 13. The Court 
discusses at great length the fact that the Supreme Court of Palestine was even stricter than 
English courts were at the time in sanctioning failures to secure the rights of defendants. 
According to the Israeli Supreme Court in Hadi, in England there was an ongoing debate 
about the exclusion of such evidence and in many cases illegally obtained evidence was 
nevertheless admitted, whereas British judges in Palestine excluded evidence far more 
readily.  
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primarily one of fact and not law. 
In an attempt to reintroduce a clear legal criterion for determining 
admissibility, in 1963 the Supreme Court redefined the boundaries between 
admissibility and weight. In Yassin v. Attorney General the Court created a 
two-prong, two-step test for illegally obtained evidence.65 First, admissibility 
and weight were crafted to correspond with objective and subjective categories 
respectively: to determine admissibility, a court asked whether the means used 
to obtain the evidence could in theory lead an innocent person to confess to a 
crime he did not commit. This question turned on both factual findings (what 
means were used by the police in that case) and a legal determination (would 
such means lead a “reasonable” defendant to confess to a crime he did not 
commit). The second stage of the test, which determined the weight of the 
evidence, was subjective: did the illegal means lead the specific defendant to 
confess?66 Answering this question depended primarily on factual findings and 
the court’s impression of the particular defendant.67 It was this subjective 
component of the test that went to the credibility of the evidence and would 
therefore affect its weight.68 
Under Yassin admissibility and weight were determined sequentially and 
based on different data: the court would have to determine the admissibility of 
evidence without looking at its content. Only after determining that the 
evidence was admissible could the court look at the evidence itself and 
determine what weight should be attached to it.69 In creating this two-step 
process, the Supreme Court appeared to be trying to approximate the judge-jury 
distinction, by “bifurcating” the judge (or more precisely, the judicial process), 
in an attempt to leave the judge ignorant of the content of the evidence unless 
he found it to be admissible.70  
65. See CrimA 307/60 Yassin v. Attorney General [1963] IsrSC 17(3) 1541, 1555-56.  
66. Id. at 1555-56.  
67. See, e.g., CrimA 115/82 Muadi v. Israel [1984] IsrSC 38(1) 197. For a discussion 
of how the particular characteristics of the accused may affect the voluntariness of a 
confession, see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 608-09 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006). 
68. It is notable that this test is applied primarily, if not exclusively, to testimonial 
evidence, as opposed to real, or physical evidence. 
69. CrimA 307/60 Yassin v. Attorney General [1963] IsrSC 17(3) 1541, 1556. 
70. Such bifurcation is suggested by some evidence scholars in the United States, and 
some courts have tried to maintain this separation in bench trials. See 1 MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 47, at § 1:37 (“In bench-tried criminal cases, the separate and 
reliable finding required by Jackson means that the court should determine voluntariness 
before taking evidence on the merits.”). But while some courts have followed this practice, 
others do not make such a distinction. Id. § 1:37 nn.15-16. Interestingly, this bifurcation of 
the proceedings was created by Justice Simon Agranat, a graduate of the University of 
Chicago, who immigrated to Israel in 1930. Agranat’s bifurcation mechanism solved one 
problem (to some degree), but it created another: Although the judge would not be unfairly 
biased by the content of the confession, she would also be denied the possibility of 
considering the substance of the evidence when ruling on its exclusion, which would be 
available to her English or American counterpart. The judge was to impose upon herself 
technical restrictions that were largely absent in bench trials in “classic” common law 
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Under the Yassin test, admissibility and weight no longer corresponded 
neatly to the law/fact division established during the Mandate period. Instead 
admissibility became entangled in fact-finding about the means by which the 
evidence was obtained, as was true in jury trials. Yassin therefore represented a 
new attempt to translate the doctrine of admissibility into Israel’s unitary 
courts. 
C.  Meiri: Admissibility as Rigidity 
The years after Yassin coincided with a broader trend in Israeli evidence 
law that extended beyond illegally obtained evidence: a move away from strict 
rules of admissibility towards more flexible standards concerning the weight of 
evidence.71 Israeli judges and legal scholars argued that rules of admissibility 
were conceptually alien to the Israeli legal system: they were devised primarily 
for juries, to shelter lay fact finders from exposure to unreliable evidence and 
data that would unfairly bias their decision.72 Israeli judges voiced frustration 
with inherited British law, marked by rigid admissibility rules that often forced 
judges to disregard reliable and relevant evidence.73  
Since professional judges thought themselves less susceptible to the perils 
of over-weighing questionable evidence, many believed that in Israel rules of 
admissibility should give way to greater judicial discretion concerning the 
weight of problematic evidence.74 More flexible standards of weight would 
enable judges to rule on a case-by-case basis, allowing the court to admit 
evidence that possessed probative value, even if it did not strictly comply with 
the common law rules of admissibility. Whereas admissibility was a binary 
“all-or-nothing” system, weight gave courts greater flexibility in dealing with 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, Agranat’s bifurcation was not complete: even if the judge would 
not be aware of the content, she would still be aware that the defendant had confessed, for 
example. 
71. See, e.g., Eliahu Harnon, Criminal Procedure and Evidence, 24 ISR. L. REV. 592, 
612-13 (1990). For a discussion of a similar move away from rules of admissibility toward 
“free proof” in other Anglo-American jurisdictions, see ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF 
EVIDENCE LAW 108-09 (2005).  
72. For an illustration of such concerns in the United States, see, for example, FED. R. 
EVID. 403. 
73. See, e.g., Uri Struzman, The Naked King or the Dominance of Juries in Israeli 
Courts, 13 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 175 (1988). Struzman, a judge at the Tel Aviv District 
Court, describes how admissibility rules often lead to the acquittal of defendants known to 
be guilty. He writes how “once again the rules of evidence have defeated the pursuit of 
justice.” Struzman then wonders why “there is still a sacredness about laws imported from a 
foreign land” and asks why “the dust is not removed from these principles . . . to determine 
whether their [foundations] are solid or whether they have grown unstable when moved from 
their native England [to Israel].” Id. at 178. Struzman makes a series of recommendations for 
reform concerning, for example, out-of-court statements and the admissibility of accomplice 
testimony.  
74. See Emanuel Gross, Should Israel Adopt a Constitutional Exclusionary Rule?, 30 
MISHPATIM 145, 149 (1998).  
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contested evidence. Admissibility came to connote rigidity and technicality, as 
opposed to the more discretionary nature of weight. 
The process of shifting away from rules of admissibility towards standards 
of weight affected the examination of illegally obtained evidence as well, and 
appears to have led the Court in Meiri away from viewing its treatment of the 
evidence (by giving it no weight) as “exclusion.”75 Rather, the Court regarded 
Meiri to be a question of weight, bringing the exclusionary rule into line with 
the broader shift in Israel away from admissibility rules.76 
But the formulation of Meiri as pertaining to weight rather than 
admissibility presented many complications that would play out in the years 
leading up to Issacharov. First, Meiri eroded the distinction between unreliable 
and illegally obtained evidence. It discounted both categories of evidence in a 
similar fashion, even though the policies underlying their treatment were quite 
different. Whereas unreliable evidence is deemed inadmissible because it 
undermines the accuracy of (jury) decisions, illegally obtained evidence, which 
is often highly reliable, is excluded to vindicate defendants’ rights. Therefore, 
despite Israel’s employment of professional fact finders (judges rather than 
juries), in the debate over the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence Israel 
was no different than any jury system. The general aversion in Israel towards 
rigid admissibility rules, which often deemed reliable evidence inadmissible, 
was irrelevant to the debate concerning the exclusion of illegally obtained 
75. This discourse infiltrated the exclusionary rule debate despite the important 
differences between the two kinds of admissibility: exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, 
as a legal question, is independent of the reliability of the evidence; it had to do with the 
rights of the defendant. See Andrew Choo & Susan Nash, Improperly Obtained Evidence in 
the Commonwealth: Lessons for England and Wales, 11 INT’L J. OF EVIDENCE & PROOF 77 
(2007).  In fact, some scholars have argued that the exclusionary rule has been improperly 
categorized as a rule of evidence, even though its “design and operation are evidence 
related,” since such exclusion is motivated by social goals that are not aimed solely toward 
fact-finding. See STEIN, supra note 71, at 25-26. Therefore, the decision of an Israeli judge to 
exclude illegally obtained evidence would be no different from that of a judge in any other 
common law jurisdiction. In any event, this improper analogy led to the formulation of Meiri 
as a rule of weight, not admissibility, thus emphasizing the courts’ discretion on the matter. 
76. Furthermore, in formulating Meiri and subsequent decisions, the Israeli Supreme 
Court wished to set itself apart from courts in the United States in the post-Miranda era. 
From an Israeli perspective, American courts seemed to reach unjust results under Miranda 
by excluding crucial evidence due to the slightest police misconduct. Yet at the same time, 
the American strict exclusion of evidence appeared to be ineffective in deterring the police 
from acting abusively. See, for example, CrimA 369/78 Abu Medijam v. State [1979] IsrSC 
33(3) 383, in which H. Cohn’s Supreme Court decision cited and discussed Dallin H. Oaks, 
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970), to 
question the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule in deterring the police. Categorizing Meiri 
as a question of weight emphasized two aspects of the Court’s flexible and discretionary 
position when treating illegally obtained evidence. First, the court’s discretion in 
determining what kinds of illegality would affect weight. Second, framing Meiri as a 
question of weight provided Israeli courts with a broad range of sanctions, beyond the binary 
options of admitting or excluding evidence; they could admit the evidence and give it little 
weight or no weight at all. 
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evidence.77   
Second, weight was now determined not only by fact (i.e., the reliability of 
the evidence), but also by law: the evidence in Meiri had no weight as a matter 
of law, as a way of protecting the defendant’s rights, not due to doubts 
concerning the evidence’s reliability.78 Defining weight as a question of law 
stood in sharp contrast to the Court’s previous approach: under the 1942 
Berkovitz distinction between admissibility and weight, legal considerations 
were at the heart of the admissibility test, while the weight test was solely 
factual.79  
Third, when stating that illegal means could “only” affect the weight of the 
evidence but not lead to its exclusion, the Court created the impression that 
there was a concrete difference between the two even in a unitary system and 
that exclusion was a more severe sanction. 
D.  Developments Abroad: The 1980s and 1990s 
To understand what occurred between Meiri and Issacharov, our analysis 
must leave Israel and examine developments in Canada, South Africa, and most 
importantly England. In 1984 England enacted the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act (PACE). Section 78 of PACE established a statutory 
discretionary exclusionary rule, providing that a court “may refuse to allow 
evidence . . . if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the 
circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was 
obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on 
the fairness of proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.”80 One might 
notice the law’s emphasis on the court’s power to deem the evidence 
inadmissible. After Meiri, looking at the English doctrine from an Israeli 
vantage point made the two doctrines seem fundamentally dissimilar: whereas 
in England such evidence could be excluded, in Israel, under Meiri, it could 
“only” be given no weight. 81 
77. As discussed above, the analogy between the two kinds of inadmissibility might 
stem from Israeli perceptions of the American legal system, which appeared to exclude 
evidence due to the slightest infringement of the defendant’s rights.  See supra note 76.  
78. As discussed earlier, admissibility was understood to be both a factual and legal 
determination by the judge in a jury trial, but weight was viewed as exclusively factual. 
79. CrimA 155/42 Berkovitz v. Attorney General [1942] 9 Palestine L. Reps. 654, 
657-658.  
80. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 78(1) (Eng.). Since this Note is 
not concerned with the reform introduced by Section 78(1) but rather with how it was 
perceived in Israel, I do not address this matter further. The formulation of Section 78 and its 
intended effects are discussed in DAVID WOLCHOVER, THE EXCLUSION OF IMPROPERLY 
OBTAINED EVIDENCE 207-14 (1986). After its enactment it was debated to what degree 
Section 78(1) had in fact modified the common law on this issue. See C.J.W. Allen, 
Discretion and Security: Excluding Evidence Under Section 78(1) of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 49 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 80 (1990).  
81. A separate yet highly relevant query is how English courts have construed Section 
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Like the PACE in England, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
of 1982 established that “where . . . a court concludes that evidence was 
obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed 
by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having 
regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”82 Lastly, in 1996 South 
Africa adopted its constitution, in which it determined that “[e]vidence 
obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be 
excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or 
otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice.”83 All three 
provisions speak of the exclusion of evidence. Furthermore, in both Canada and 
South Africa the provision was a constitutional one, as it had been construed to 
be in the United States. 
Israeli courts and scholars looking at developments abroad got the 
unwarranted impression that Israel was falling behind other enlightened 
democracies: whereas foreign courts were allowed to exclude illegally obtained 
evidence, Israeli courts under the Meiri doctrine could “only” diminish its 
weight, which seemed a less extreme sanction and less protective of 
defendants’ rights, even though the Israeli Supreme Court had clearly 
demonstrated in Meiri that it could give such evidence no weight at all.  
Furthermore, in the United States,84 Canada, South Africa, and even England85 
the exclusionary rule had become a constitutional issue, whereas in Israel it had 
been viewed as merely a procedural matter, not associated with a supreme law. 
When in 1992, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was passed, leading 
Chief Justice Barak to proclaim the beginning of a “Constitutional 
78(1) and under what circumstances they have in fact excluded evidence. Scholars have 
recently argued that in England the section has been narrowly applied, especially concerning 
physical evidence, due to a restrictive interpretation of the term “fair trial.” See Choo & 
Nash, supra note 75, at 78-79. This should have perhaps interested the Israeli Supreme Court 
when citing foreign authority on the matter. 
82. See Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, 
ch. 11, § 24(2) (U.K.). 
83. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. II (Bill of Rights), § 35(5). South Africa was the only 
nonjury jurisdiction mentioned in Issacharov. Perhaps focusing more closely on the South 
African model would have indicated to the Israeli Supreme Court that there was little 
practical difference between the Meiri doctrine and the South African approach. 
84. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961) (“There are in these cases of this 
Court some passing references to the Weeks rule as being one of evidence. But the plain and 
unequivocal language of Weeks—and its later paraphrase in Wolf—to the effect that the 
Weeks rule is of constitutional origin, remains clearly undisturbed.”). 
85. See A and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] UKHL 71 
(U.K.), § 51 (“It trivialises the issue before the House to treat it as an argument about the law 
of evidence. The issue is one of constitutional principle, whether evidence obtained by 
torturing another human being may lawfully be admitted against a party to proceedings in a 
British court, irrespective of where, or by whom, or on whose authority the torture was 
inflicted.”). 
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Revolution,”86 the time seemed ripe to align Israeli law with that of other 
common law jurisdictions by giving courts the power to exclude illegally 
obtained evidence based on a quasi-constitutional provision. 
And indeed a number of law journal articles from the mid 1990s onward 
advocated the recognition of a constitutional exclusionary rule in Israel, citing 
both the Constitutional Revolution and the new developments abroad as 
reasons for change.87 Chief Justice Barak himself referred in a 1996 article to 
the influence of the Constitutional Revolution on criminal procedure, indicating 
that one of the possible effects could be the authority of courts to exclude 
illegally obtained evidence.88 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court indicated 
its eagerness for reform in its written opinions. In a series of decisions from 
1996 onward, the Court hinted strongly that it was prepared to recognize such a 
constitutional exclusionary rule, but was awaiting an appropriate case.89 
Issacharov, a seemingly routine matter submitted for review in 1998, provided 
exactly such an opportunity to complete the Revolution. But little attention was 
given to how a new exclusionary rule would differ in practice from the Meiri 
doctrine. Only one scholar noted the de facto resemblance in the operation of 
the two rules. The differences were mostly declarative and symbolic.90 
E.  The Exclusionary Rule and Rejection of Legal Transplants 
 Israel’s difficulty in satisfactorily translating the common law’s 
admissibility and weight distinction and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
developments abroad illustrate some of the inherent challenges which have led 
Pierre Legrand to conclude that legal transplants are “impossible.” Legrand has 
emphasized that legal rules are more than mere propositional statements and go 
beyond the words that constitute them. They consist of the meaning given to 
them and by their operation in practice, which in turn are products of history, 
culture, language, politics, sociology, anthropology and economics. To import a 
single line of text without its broader context, he says, is both superficial and 
86. See Aharon Barak, The Constitutional Revolution: Protected Human Rights, 1 
MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 9 (1992); see also CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal 
Cooperative Village [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 221, 342, 447.  
87. See Gross, supra note 74; Harnon, supra note 22.  
88. See Aharon Barak, The Constitutionalization of Israeli Law: The Basic Laws on 
Human Rights and Criminal Law, 13 BAR-ILAN L. STUD. 5, 24 (1996). Barak also discussed 
the possible effects of the Constitutional Revolution on the presumption of innocence and 
the right to silence. He further elaborated on these ideas in an English-language article 
written in 1997. See Aharon Barak, The Constitutionalization of the Israeli Legal System as 
a Result of the Basic Laws and Its Effects on Procedural and Substantive Criminal Law, 31 
ISR. L. REV. 3, 19 (1997). 
89. See, e.g., CrimA 2180/02 Kassem v. State [2002] IsrSC 57(1) 642, 654; CrimA 
5203/98 Hasson v. Israel, [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 274, 283, § 7.  
90. See Harnon, supra note 22, at 1021.  
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misleading.91  
 Transplanting the exclusionary rule to Israel largely illustrates Legrand’s 
theory. The Issacharov Court sought to import the English rule, but focused too 
narrowly on the linguistic aspects of the term “admissibility,” rather than what 
it meant. Although Israeli law, and the law of Palestine before it, had 
incorporated the terminology of admissibility and weight into Israeli evidence 
law, these terms and the distinction between them had developed a distinctly 
Israeli character, which diverged from their meaning in English, Canadian, or 
American law. These terms could not be identical because of the structural 
differences discussed in this Note (the relation between admissibility and 
bifurcation), but also because of broader cultural and historical factors that have 
affected application of the exclusionary rule and the goals it seeks to achieve.92 
The distinctly Israeli flavor of the terms admissibility and weight had 
colored the Israeli perception of developments abroad. Rather than examining 
the significance of PACE from an English perspective, Israeli jurists focused on 
what changes Section 78 of PACE would have introduced had it been passed in 
Israel. They concentrated on what were regarded to be unifying characteristics, 
assuming that admissibility connoted the same thing in both countries. 
However, obliterating the requisite distance between self and other led to a 
questionable understanding of what “exclusion” would change in the Israeli 
legal system and ultimately to the Issacharov ruling. The reason for this strong 
focus on developments abroad while largely overlooking the implications upon 
the local legal system will be addressed in the following Part. 
III. THE ANGLICIZATION OF ISRAELI EVIDENCE LAW 
Comparative law played a crucial role in the formulation of Issacharov. 
91. Legrand, supra note 11, at 119.  
92. For example, when determining the proper objectives of the exclusionary rule in 
Israel, it is insufficient to note that American courts have focused on police deterrence 
whereas other countries have considered the fairness of trial and the potential disrepute to the 
judiciary to be relevant factors. In evaluating these competing objectives one must 
determine, for example, whether the crime rate in Israel is comparable to that of the United 
States. One must further determine whether excluding evidence can in fact deter Israeli 
police from abusive conduct, without relying solely on empirical data from the United States 
that supports or questions the efficacy of such measures. Similarly, evaluating the disrepute 
caused to the judiciary by admitting such evidence depends on existing perceptions of the 
judicial system as well as concepts of what constitutes a fair trial. These determinations may 
be affected by history, religion, and culture, and they may even differ between populations 
within a single jurisdiction. The perception of the judiciary in post-Apartheid South Africa, 
for example, may be quite different than in Canada. Within South Africa, the white 
population may perceive the judiciary differently than the black population. Similarly, courts 
in England might exclude evidence of terrorist activity in a criminal trial since it was 
obtained through torture, because its admission may cause disrepute or affect the fairness of 
trial, whereas Israeli courts may conclude that excluding such evidence and acquitting a self-
proclaimed terrorist might result in disrepute within Israeli society. As we can see, 
transplanting legal formulae tells us little about their proper application.  
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Developments abroad seem to have sparked the ruling; the sense that Israel was 
falling out of line with a group of nations with which it identified from a legal 
standpoint meant that action had to be taken. The Issacharov Court drew on 
constitutions, legislation, and precedents from what it repeatedly referred to as 
“legal systems similar to our own”—namely those of England, the United 
States, Canada, South Africa, and Australia—to explain why reform was 
crucial and why courts had both the authority and responsibility to initiate it.93 
One of the striking features of the Supreme Court’s comparative analysis in 
Issacharov is its reliance solely upon common law jurisdictions.94 The Court 
completely overlooked the experience of Continental European courts, though 
many civil law jurisdictions had recently adopted versions of the exclusionary 
rule.95 Pointing out that even civil law countries, which do not typically bar 
evidence, had devised an exclusionary rule for illegally obtained evidence 
would have strengthened the Israeli Supreme Court’s claim of an international 
consensus. Yet the Court ignored this trend.  
The experience of Continental European jurisdictions might have been 
more pertinent to Israel than that of common law countries. After all, Israel’s 
unitary trial courts had struggled to translate and incorporate common law 
admissibility rules, which assume bifurcation. Continental systems, typically 
unitary, have generally recognized their inability to regulate the exposure of 
fact finders to questionable evidence.96 They therefore have not focused on 
“admissibility” in the sense of regulating input of contested information. Rather 
they have concentrated on regulating their output and ensuring that written 
93. See CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] (not yet 
published), §§ 40, 50, 55, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/98/210/051/n21/ 
98051210.n21.pdf.  
94. The one exception is the brief mention of the European Convention of Human 
Rights and the European Court of Human Rights in Issacharov. Id. § 58. However, the Court 
only noted that the European Court of Human Rights has not mandated exclusion and has 
approved of England’s discretional exclusion when admission would adversely affect the 
fairness of the trial.  
95. Courts in Germany, Italy, and France have all adopted some version of the 
exclusionary rule. See Craig M. Bradley, The Emerging International Consensus as to 
Criminal Procedure Rules, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L. 171 (1993); Walter Pakter, Exclusionary 
Rules in France, Germany and Italy, 9 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1985). However, 
in the absence of juries these countries do not make the distinction between admissibility and 
weight. In France for example, the result of a decision to exclude is that the evidence is 
removed from the dossier and may not be referred to by the parties or by the judge in his 
decision. See Richard Vogler, Criminal Procedure in France, in COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE, 14, 48-49 (John Hatchard et al. eds., 1996). Similarly, in Germany the fact 
finder is exposed to the contested evidence but asked not to rely upon it in his written 
decision. See Christian Fahl, The Guarantee of Defense Counsel and the Exclusionary Rules 
on Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in Germany, 8 GER. L.J., Nov. 1, 2007, 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol08No11/PDF_Vol_08_No_11_1053-
1067_Articles_Fahl.pdf.  
96. See Fahl, supra note 95. 
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decisions do not rely on excluded evidence.97 Had Israel followed such a 
model more closely and understood that speaking of “admissibility” in the strict 
common law sense is largely meaningless in a unitary system, it could have 
avoided some of the confusion between admissibility and weight. It would have 
realized that the Meiri doctrine of giving illegally obtained evidence no weight 
was commensurate to the model of many Continental systems which prohibit 
reliance upon such evidence in a written decision even if it is “admitted.” 
In this Part I shall examine why the Israeli Supreme Court relies so heavily 
upon the common law despite the incompatibility between the systems. I 
explore some of the historical, linguistic, and cultural factors that have shaped 
Israel’s strong relationship with the common law. I then try to place these 
factors within the broader context of why codes and legal doctrines travel and 
what choices of comparative law can teach us about the self-perception and 
identity of a legal system. Finally, I consider the perils of self-definition 
through comparative law and of uncritical emulation of foreign legal systems. 
A.  The Empirical Basis 
 One of the striking attributes of the Israeli Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
is the Court’s heavy reliance upon comparative law in its rulings.98 However, 
while the Court often cites decisions from common law jurisdictions, it rarely 
cites Continental European decisions, constitutions, or laws. An empirical study 
97. Whereas “common law systems seek to regulate the presentation of evidence to the 
decision maker, continental systems put emphasis on the regulation of the decision itself and 
eventually on the motivation in the (written) decision.” Johanes F. Nijboer, Methods of 
Investigation and Exclusion of Evidence: A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Perspective, 
in BEWEISVERBOTE IN LÄNDERN DER EU UND VERGLECHBAREN RECHTSORDNUNGEN 
[EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE WITHIN THE EU AND BEYOND] 39, 40 (1997). In contrast to 
Continental systems that are unable to regulate the flow of information to the fact finder due 
to lack of bifurcation, common law systems often suffer from an inability to monitor the 
motivations of lay fact finders. See DAMASKA, supra note 15, at 48-49. This is because juries 
do not produce reasoned decisions. Furthermore, the common law’s reluctance to scrutinize 
jury deliberations even in cases of clear jury misconduct, further complicates the task of 
ensuring the fairness of the decision. See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987). 
Scholars view these factors as reasons for the common law’s strong emphasis upon 
regulating the information to which lay fact finders are exposed. See DAMASKA, supra note 
15, at 41, 44; FISHER, supra note 17, at 15-16. Damaska explains that since juries do not give 
reasons for their decisions, they suffer from a “legitimacy deficit,” which can only be 
mitigated by regulating the database to which they are exposed. DAMASKA, supra note 15, at 
41, 44. 
98. See HCJ 7081/93 Botzer v. Local Council of Macabim-Reut [1996] IsrSC 50(1) 19 
(citing Canadian and Australian law in interpreting the right to equality and defining 
discrimination); HCJ 73/53 “Kol Ha’am” Co. Ltd. v. Minister of the Interior [1953] IsrSC 
7(2) 871 (citing American and English authorities in determining the scope of the freedom of 
speech); see also HCJ 316/03 Bakri v. Censorship Council [2003] IsrSC 58(1) 249 (citing 
American and Australian case law in determining the proper scope of the freedom of 
speech); HCJ 4112/99 Adalah v. Municipality of Tel Aviv-Jaffa [2002] 56(5) 393 (citing 
Canadian law in defining lingual equality). 
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conducted in Israel in 1994 that sought to outline the citation patterns of the 
Israeli Supreme Court over forty-six years of statehood confirmed a significant 
decline in citations of Continental legal systems. By 1994 the Supreme Court 
did not cite even a single Continental legal source.99 However, perhaps 
surprisingly, the research also showed that even during the first decades of 
statehood, when many of Israel’s leading jurists were immigrants who had been 
educated in Continental Europe (primarily Germany), the Supreme Court never 
relied heavily on Continental sources.100 Only 0.5% of citations have been to 
Continental sources, and in no year have they exceeded 2%.101  
In contrast, reliance on the common law, primarily English and American 
sources, has been far greater. On average, 20.9% of the Israeli Supreme Court’s 
citations have been to common law jurisdictions.102 Reliance upon the 
common law peaked in 1952, when as many as 38.1% of citations in published 
opinions named common law sources. Of the various common law sources, 
American precedents and scholarly work have grown more prominent, claiming 
no citations at all in 1948 and 5.1% in 1994. English sources have steadily 
declined, falling from 24.4% to only 2.3%.103 The greater influence of 
99. See Yoram Shachar et al., Citation Practices of the Supreme Court: Quantitative 
Analyses, 27 MISHPATIM 119, 152 (1996). The decline in the influence of the civil law is not 
unique to Israel and has been observed as a general phenomenon extending to other countries 
as well. See Ugo Mattei, Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western Law, 
42 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 200 (1994) (book review). 
100. The study does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Israeli judges were not 
influenced by European jurisprudence, but it does indicate the formal sources that the judges 
regarded as authoritative and what they consciously chose to cite. In an article discussing the 
German influences on the Israeli Supreme Court, Salzberger and Oz-Salzberger argue that 
although the Court rarely cites German sources, the influence of German thought and 
jurisprudence on the early decisions of the Court was profound. They explain that the 
Justices may have been reluctant to cite German sources in the years following the 
Holocaust. They further note that even in the 1990s, when the new Israeli Criminal Code 
was presented to the Knesset, no formal mention was made in the proposal to German law 
despite the clear reliance upon the German Code in the formulation of the Israeli law. This 
demonstrates, in their opinion, how the German tradition in Israel is very much alive, but 
hidden. Eli Salzberger & Fania Oz-Salzberger, The German Heritage of the Israeli Supreme 
Court, 21 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 259 (1998). Another possibility is that the typically shorter 
opinions of European Courts provide less material from which to quote or cite, making 
Anglo-American courts a more attractive source. 
101. This peak was reached in 1954. Other years of relative peaks were 1948, 1955, 
and 1975, during which the court cited Continental law in only 1.3% of cases. Shachar et al., 
supra note 99.  
102. This does not include decisions from the Mandate period, which the authors 
characterized as Israeli precedents, even though many of the decisions were rendered by 
British colonial judges. See Shachar et al., supra note 99.  
103. The fact that a decision has been cited does not mean that it was followed. For 
example, in Issacharov the Supreme Court cited American precedents and scholarship, yet 
went on to explain why the American model has gone too far in excluding evidence that 
should be admitted. See CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] (not 
yet published), §§ 60-61, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/98/210/051/n21/ 
98051210.n21.pdf. Nevertheless, even though the United States model had been rejected in 
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American law in the post-World War II era has been observed outside Israel as 
well.104 This empirical project ended in 1994, only shortly after the 1992 
Constitutional Revolution. Though lacking updated data, we may suspect that 
since 1994 there has been a growing reliance on Canadian, Australian, and 
South African law, especially as some formulations in Israel’s Basic Laws were 
founded upon provisions from the Canadian Charter.105 
B.  The British Mandate and Its Legacy 
One of the most convincing explanations for Israel’s strong reliance upon 
common law sources, especially English precedents and scholarship, is the 
historical tie between Israel and England, which began during the British 
Mandate over Palestine. In 1922, in the aftermath of World War I, the British 
were given a mandate by the League of Nations to prepare Palestine for self-
governance.106 As part of the preparation for self-rule, the British performed 
considerable legal reform in Palestine, enacting new laws and ordinances, 
restructuring the Ottoman legal system (which was based primarily on Muslim 
and French laws), and introducing into Mandate Palestine many institutions of 
the English common law. Many of the laws enacted in Palestine were based on 
English and colonial legislation and used similar formulations.107 The laws of 
Palestine were also often interpreted by British colonial judges who drew on 
English precedents in determining their scope and meaning. The 1922 Palestine 
Order in Council, the “constitution” of the Palestine Mandate, provided that in 
cases of lacunae, the Palestine courts were authorized to rely upon the common 
law and doctrines of equity.108 Furthermore, decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Palestine could be appealed to the Privy Council.109 
Israel’s ties to English law outlived the Palestine Mandate and were 
Israel, it has still served as a point of reference that informed the Court when formulating the 
Israeli approach. This cannot be said for the German, Italian, or French approaches, which 
were not even considered.  
104. See Mattei, supra note 99, at 207. 
105. See Emanuel Gross, The Procedural Rights of Suspects and Defendants, 15 BAR-
ILAN L. STUD.  155, 156 (1996). For example, Section 1 of the Canadian Charter “guarantees 
the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law 
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” Part I of the Constitution 
Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 1 (U.K.). Similarly, Article 8 
of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty has a similar provision that reads: “There shall be 
no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State 
of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose and to an extent no greater than is required.” Basic 
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 1391.   
106. See The Palestine Mandate, art. 2, July 24, 1922. 
107. See Daniel Friedmann, Infusion of the Common Law into the Legal System of 
Israel, 10 ISR. L. REV. 324, 326 (1975). 
108. See Palestine Order in Council 1922, art. 46; see also Friedmann, supra note 107, 
at 359. 
109. Palestine Order in Council 1922, art. 44. 
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officially severed only in 1980.110 The reasons for the ongoing reliance upon 
English law were many. First, during the early years of statehood, Israeli courts 
had only a limited body of local precedent from which to draw. Therefore, 
when new questions arose, courts continued to rely upon English precedents 
and continued to consult English authorities, much as they did during the 
Mandate period. Second, until 1972, some laws that remained in force from the 
Mandate period required Israeli courts to follow English interpretations and 
precedents.111 Third, even in cases in which the law made no such formal 
requirement, since many statutory provisions were based upon the laws of 
England (and were often even worded in the same manner), English precedent 
remained highly useful and relevant in addressing problems of interpretation. 
For example, the Israeli Evidence Ordinance continues to require that 
confessions be “free and voluntary,” a wording that has remained unaltered 
since its enactment under the British Mandate in 1924.112 Even after Israel 
severed all formal ties to English law in 1980, courts have continued to draw 
upon English legislation and precedent. 
C.  Legal Education 
A related factor that has contributed to Israel’s strong reliance upon the 
common law is the legal education of Israeli judges and scholars over the years. 
Beginning in the Mandate period, many of Palestine’s leading judges and 
scholars traveled to England to pursue a higher legal education. Lawyers who 
were trained locally did so in the “Law Classes,” a legal training program 
established by the British in Palestine in 1920.113 The tradition of legal 
scholars seeking higher education in England continued after the establishment 
of the state: well into the 1960s many of Israel’s leading jurists pursued their 
110. See Foundations of Law Act, 5740-1980, 34 LSI 181 (1979-80) (Isr.), which in 
Section 2 formally abolished Article 46 of the Palestine Order in Council. The law 
determined that in cases in which analogy, statute or case law provide no clear rule of 
decision, the courts shall decide “in light of the principles of freedom, justice, equity and 
peace of Israel’s heritage” rather than based upon the “the substance of the common law, and 
the doctrines of equity in force in England” mentioned in Article 46.  
111. See Shachar et al., supra note 99, at 158. However, in 1957 the Israeli Supreme 
Court ruled that it no longer considered itself obligated to rely upon English precedent even 
when required so by law. Id.  
112. Compare Evidence Ordinance § 9, 1 Laws of Palestine 670 (1924) (Isr.), with 
Evidence Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971 § 12, 2 LSI 198 (1968-72) (Isr.).    
113. See ASSAF LIKHOVSKI, LAW AND IDENTITY IN MANDATE PALESTINE 110 (2006); 
Friedmann, supra, note 107, at 326. Before the arrival of the British, the legal profession in 
Palestine was extremely underdeveloped, with only approximately sixty practicing lawyers. 
In 1930, the Bar had a membership of approximately 260 and by the end of the Mandate in 
1948, this number had jumped to one thousand. See Nathan Brun, Early Foundations of the 
Israeli Judicial System: Judges and Lawyers in Eretz-Israel 1908-1930, 84-85, 321-322 (Oct. 
2003) (unpublished Doctor of Law dissertation) (on file with the author).  
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studies for higher degrees in Oxford, Cambridge, and London.114 As such 
Israel can be viewed as part of a broader phenomenon whereby jurists in former 
British colonies continued to seek their higher legal education in England’s 
leading colleges rather than at local unive
In legal education as in citation practices, the United States replaced 
England in its status as a metropole of legal influence upon the Israeli 
“periphery”; with time, the United States became the primary destination for 
doctoral studies in law.115 Furthermore, some of Israel’s leading jurists over 
the years have been immigrants from the United States,116 perhaps most 
notably Chief Justice Simon Agranat (who delivered the opinion of the Court in 
Yassin), who was a graduate of the University of Chicago. In recent years the 
Israeli Supreme Court has routinely employed American law clerks to assist in 
comparative research, thus furthering the influence of American law and the 
law of other English-speaking countries upon the Court’s decisions. 
However, legal education cannot entirely account for the dominance of the 
common law’s influences upon Israel, at least not during the early years of 
Israeli statehood. Although many of Israel’s leading jurists during the first 
years of statehood were trained in Germany and other civil law countries, their 
heritage had little influence upon the Israeli judiciary, at least as measured by 
the Supreme Court’s citation practices.117 Some argue that World War II led 
German-trained jurists not to rely upon German law, especially in questions of 
procedure.118 After witnessing the atrocities of Nazi Germany, German 
114. A partial list of Israeli jurists who sought their higher legal education in England 
includes: Chief Justice Itzhak Olshan, Chief Justice Moshe Landau, Chief Justice Yoel 
Sussman, Justice David Goitein, Justice Zvi Berenson, Justice Itzhak Zamir, Professor and 
former Minister of Justice Amnon Rubinstein, Professor and former Israeli Ambassador to 
the United Nations Yehuda Blum, Professor Ruth Gavison, Professor Hanina Ben 
Menachem. The younger generation who studied in England in the 1980s includes 
Professors Alon Harel and Alex Stein.  
115. See A.M. Apelbom, Common Law A L’Americaine, 1 ISR. L. REV. 562, 578 
(1996); Stephen Goldstein, Israel, in MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL 
FAMILY 453 (Vernon Valentine Palmer ed. 2001). The list is long but a few examples will be 
mentioned: Justice Shneor Zalman Cheshin who served on the first Supreme Court was a 
graduate of N.Y.U. Law School; Professor and Minister of Justice Daniel Friedmann; 
Justices Ayala Procaccia and Asher Grunis; Professors Eyal Benvenisti, Celia Fassberg, 
Zohar Goshen, Alexander Kedar, Assaf Likhovski, Ron Harris, Lucian Arye Babchuk, Leora 
Bilski, Michael Birnhack, Yishai Blank, Aeyal Gross, Ehud Guttel, Menachem Mautner, and 
Yoram Margaliot.  
116. Dean Stephen Goldstein of the Hebrew University and Dean Arnold Enker of 
Bar-Ilan University are examples. 
117. A few such examples of Continentally trained jurists are Moshe Smoira, Israel’s 
first chief justice, who studied law in Heidelberg; Justice Menachem Dunkelblum (Vienna); 
Justice Haim Cohn (Frankfurt and Hamburg); Justice Alfred Witkon (Freiburg); Felix 
Rosenbluth, Israel’s first Minister of Justice (Freiburg and Berlin); Uri Yadin, who served as 
the head of the Legislative Division within the Ministry of Justice (Berlin). See Salzberger & 
Oz-Salzberger, supra note 100.  
118. See Stephen Goldstein, The Odd Couple: Common Law Procedure and Civilian 
Substantive Law, 78 TUL. L. REV. 291, 293-94 (2003).  
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immigrants and Holocaust survivors perhaps preferred the safeguards of Anglo-
American civil liberties and criminal procedural rights to the inquisitorial 
systems in which they had been trained.119  
One must not underestimate the intensity of anti-German sentiment during 
Israel’s early years. Israel did not establish diplomatic relations with Germany 
until 1965; Israel’s willingness to accept reparations from Germany was highly 
controversial during the 1950s and many Israelis have boycotted German 
goods. As for legal influences, when the 1992 Penal Code was presented to the 
Israeli Parliament, its German origins and influences were deliberately 
downplayed to avoid possible opposition on that ground.120 And by the time 
Israel had become more willing to accept German law as a source of legal 
inspiration, the number of those able to draw meaningfully on German sources 
had shriveled. 
D.  Language and Availability of Sources 
Language has also played an increasingly important role in promoting the 
influence of Anglo-American law upon Israel. English is taught at Israeli 
primary schools from an early age and is the only compulsory foreign language 
in the Israeli matriculation exam. Even scholars who speak or understand other 
foreign languages often do not have the requisite command to conduct 
comparative legal research and rely only upon translated secondary sources and 
materials. In this respect, the situation in Israel today stands in sharp contrast to 
earlier years, when many jurists were immigrants who spoke multiple European 
languages such as German, French, and Italian.121  
A closely related factor is the availability of sources. Due to a growing 
language barrier and the general inability of Israelis to draw on non-English 
sources, universities and libraries have cut back on their investment in books in 
other languages. Furthermore, databases such as LexisNexis and Westlaw, 
which are often consulted by the courts when conducting comparative research, 
have allowed far greater accessibility and ease of reference to sources from 
English-speaking common law countries, while providing only limited access 
to Continental European opinions.  
119. Id. at 294; John H. Langbein, The Influence of the German Emigrés on American 
Law: The Curious Case of Civil and Criminal Procedure, in DER EINFLUß DEUTSCHER 
EMIGRANTEN AUF DIE RECHTSENTWICKLUNG IN DEN USA UND IN DEUTSCHLAND 321, 330 
(Marcus Lutter et al. eds., 1993); Mattei, supra note 99, at 209. 
120. Salzberger & Oz-Salzberger, supra note 100, at 278. The bill emphasized the 
reliance upon other European jurisdictions such as Belgium, France, Switzerland, and 
Iceland. 
121. See supra note 117. Some additional examples are Professors Guido Tedeschi, 
Gualtiero Procaccia, and Alfredo Rabello, who immigrated from Italy; Professor Claude 
Klein, who immigrated from France; Professor and Justice Izhak Englard, who immigrated 
from Switzerland.  
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F.  octrines Travel: Problem Solving, External Imposition and 
Emulation 
 
E.  Israeli Procedure and the Common Law 
Scholars have noted that the influence of the common law in Israel can be 
sensed most profoundly in procedural fields. Stephen Goldstein observes a 
similar phenomenon in other “mixed jurisdictions” such as South Africa, 
Louisiana, Quebec, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines: although these 
jurisdictions often apply substantive law founded upon Continental models, 
they do so through common law procedure.122 When trying to explain this 
trend, Goldstein points to the “missionary zeal” with which England and the 
United States implemented their procedural system abroad and the mysterious 
“emotional attachment” that they created among colonized nations.123 This 
emotional attachment can be linked to what John Langbein has referred to as 
the “Cult of the Common Law”—the protective aura that common law 
procedures and institutions enjoy within Anglo-American jurisdictions due to 
common law’s historic accomplishments in securing civil liberties such as 
habeas corpus and trial by jury.124  
Goldstein also points out the “built-in lobby of the legal profession” for 
retaining common law procedure.125 Legal practitioners enjoy the greater 
prestige that the common law affords them: lawyers enjoy “their heroic 
gladiatorial role,” and judges enjoy the glory that comes with individually 
written opinions (especially as compared to the seemingly bureaucratic role that 
judges play in many Continental systems).126 As noted above, Goldstein views 
the experience of World War II as an additional factor that has caused Israel to 
prefer common law procedure and has distanced it from inquisitorial 
127
Why Legal D
After examining the particular causes for Israel’s close relationship with 
the common law, let us now turn to a slightly different line of inquiry: what 
authority does comparative law command in Israeli courts, what purpose does it 
serve, and what role did it play in the Issacharov opinion? As discussed earlier, 
during certain periods in Israeli history, English law had an authority of binding 
122. See Goldstein, supra note 118, at 292. 
123. Id. at 294. 
124. See Langbein, supra note 54, at 554. 
125. Goldstein, supra note 118, at 295. 
126. See id. 
127. See id. at 294. For a discussion of this phenomenon within American legal 
scholarship as well, see Langbein, supra note 119, at 330, and Langbein, supra note 54, at 
554. Langbein notes a typical dismissal of comparative Continental procedure by American 
scholars: “Before you go on telling me any more about the virtues of German civil 
procedure, please explain why they had Hitler and we did not.” Langbein, supra note 54, at 
554. 
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y grafting common law characteristics 
onto
change through economic and political incentives and threat of 
sanc
on law country has gained in legal academia and within the judiciary 
 
precedent. Although English law no longer possesses this formal power, 
decisions like Issacharov demonstrate that the common law still holds sway 
beyond merely infusing foreign insight into a common legal problem. The 
Supreme Court’s reliance upon the common law in Issacharov is closely linked 
to the broader inquiry of how and why codes and legal doctrines travel, a 
question that has sparked interest in recent years. Not only in Israel, but in 
South America too, recent reforms of criminal procedure and rules of evidence 
have revived the transplantation debate b
 historically inquisitorial procedure. 
When trying to account for the legal reform in South America, scholars 
have pointed to three groups of factors: problem solving, external imposition, 
and emulation.128 The problem-solving theory emphasizes the role of 
comparative experience in supplying data and policy options for confronting 
common problems, primarily judicial inefficiency and corruption in the South 
American example. The external imposition theory emphasizes the role of 
foreign countries (primarily the United States in the South American case) in 
promoting 
tions. 
Emulation theories suggest that countries often mimic practices of nations 
they admire or with whom they wish to identify. According to this account, 
legal borrowing often stems from a sense of identity and from the self-
perception of the adopting country rather than solely from the wisdom of a 
legal rule or its intrinsic value. Emulation theories bear a close relationship to 
postcolonialism: many former colonies continue to emulate the law of the 
metropole, though they are not formally obligated to do so, to express their 
sense of identity.129 Cultural scholars have noted such mimicry of nonlegal 
trappings of the metropole in former colonies, which are sometimes exalted and 
preserved with greater fervor than in Europe.130 English practices, adopted by 
colonial elites, have come to symbolize status. This theory of emulation fits 
well within the broader framework discussed above concerning the legacy of 
the British Mandate and the importance that obtaining a higher legal education 
in a comm
128. See Máximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: 
Diffusion of Legal Ideas from the Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 621-22, 666-69 (2007). 
129. Id. at 622. 
130. See, e.g., HOMI K. BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 85-92 (1994) (exploring 
the concept of “mimicry”); Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa, in 
INVENTION OF TRADITION 211, 261 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1993). Ranger 
points out that Europeans are perceived as the “alpha and omega of gentlemanly refinement 
and lady-like elegance” and that “the body of invented traditions imported from Europe . . . 
in some parts of Africa still exercises an influence on ruling class culture which it has largely 
lost in Europe itself.” However, Ranger also observes that European neotraditional 
symbolism was not always adopted as a form of “aping” but by “an impressive display of 
[Africans’] ability to keep up to date, to discern the realities of colonial power and to 
comment shrewdly upon them.” Id. at 237.  
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G. The Dangers of Treating Foreign Law as Precedent 
Although Israeli courts are no longer bound by English precedent and 
never were bound by other common law jurisdictions, Issacharov and decisions 
like it hint strongly that comparative common law is not cited merely because it 
“contains an insight that bears on the case at hand.”131 Comparative law is 
cited as authority on how the law should work and “has weight irrespective of 
the cogency of its reasoning”;132 it holds a power like that of precedent. Other 
common law nations are viewed not as equals but with an aura of superiority. 
To borrow a commonly used colonial metaphor, Israel looks to England and 
other nations for parental approval of its jurisprudence. In this regard Israel can 
be viewed as experiencing a broader postcolonial syndrome, residual of the 
Mandate era. It clung to British traditions and heritage, with the common law 
and developments in other former colonies and dominions serving as proxies of 
English law.133 Although Israelis do not tend to view Israel within a colonial 
framework, it shares some of the emulation patterns that scholars have 
observed in other British colo
ard the English metropole can also been seen in the literary work of Israeli 
authors such as Amos Oz.134 
However, emulating the laws of other common law nations and treating 
them as binding precedent carry great risks, as Issacharov shows. Even 
comparative law partisans in the United States such as Cass Sunstein, Eric 
Posner, and Mark Tushnet caution against regarding foreign law as 
“precedent.” Tushnet defines precedent as “a decision that carries normative 
weight because of the authority of the court that issues it and not because of the 
reasons that support it.”135 A precedent leads courts to “accede to the authority 
of the issuing court” even if they disagree with its reasoning.136 Issacharov 
131. Richard A. Posner, Enlightened Despot, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 23, 2007, at 
53, 54 (reviewing AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY (2006)). 
132. Id. at 54-55. 
133. Friedmann regarded the influence of American law as an alternative to English 
law during the early years of statehood when English precedent still had binding force in 
Israel. American law was cited as authority when the Supreme Court found English law 
unsatisfactory or undesirable for Israeli society. See Daniel Friedmann, Independent 
Development of Israeli Law, 10 ISR. L. REV. 515, 522 (1975). 
134. See AMOS OZ, A TALE OF LOVE AND DARKNESS 2 (Nicholas de Lange trans., 
2004) (2003) (“On my parents’ scale of values, the more western something was the more 
cultured it was considered. For all that Tolstoy and Dostoevski were dear to their Russian 
souls, I suspect that Germany—despite Hitler—seemed to them more cultured than Russia or 
Poland, and France more so than Germany. England stood even higher on their scale than 
France. As for America, there they were not so sure: after all, it was a country where people 
shot at Indians, held up mail trains, chased gold and hunted girls.”). 
135. See Mark Tushnet, supra note 9, at 1284.  
136. Id.  
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suggests we broaden this definition of precedent to apply where the citing court 
fails to critically examine
ch it stands—in this case the bifurcation of the judicial process—but still 
accedes to its authority.  
Nevertheless, rather than regarding the Israeli example as proof of why 
comparative law should not be referenced by American courts and citing 
Issacharov as a case in point, one might instead focus on the differences 
between Israel and the United States. Distinguishing between the two countries 
may highlight the reasons why Americans have less reason to fear the citation 
of foreign judgments than do other nations, including Israel. As Tushnet noted, 
American judges are unlikely to view a foreign authority as binding in any 
sense. Even American judges who refer to comparative law do so rarely and 
only to ensure that a judgment arrived at independently is not “wildly 
inconsistent with judgments elsewhere.”137 The decision process in Issacharov 
was quite the opposite: the decision was the product of an imagined disjuncture 
between group norms. The Court looked at foreign practices and found Israeli 
jurisprudence inconsistent with that of other countries, and therefore cha
eli law. To borrow a metaphor used by Canadian Justice Gerard La Forest, 
in Issacharov comparative law became the master rather than the tool.138  
Israel’s position in the world may help explain the profound influence of 
comparative law upon its judges: Israel is a young139 and small country with a 
fairly recent colonial past. Its limited experience and its desire to belong to a 
broader community of nations with whom it most identifies may have moved it 
to emulate other legal systems even when the analogies drawn have been 
questionable and problematic. Foreign decisions may have been cited not solely 
because of the quality of their reasoning or applicability to Israel, but prima
use the courts that rendered them commanded authority and respect and 
Israeli courts believed that they could not fall out of line with their rulings.  
In contrast, the United States stands at the opposite end of the spectrum: its 
post-World War II emergence as world leader in legal influence has endowed 
its judges with the confidence not to conform to foreign practices. Its record for 
initiating legal revolutions that later spread abroad may embolden its judges to 
stand proudly even when standing alone. These factors, along with sentiments 
of American Exceptionalism, which some scholars perceive to be at the core of 
rejecting foreign law as a source of inspiration,140 guarantee an effective 
safeguard that the law of other nations will not be treated as binding precedent. 
137. Id. at 1285.  
138. R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588, 639 (Can.).  
139. For a discussion of how and why the age of a country may affect reliance on 
foreign law, see Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 131 (2006).  The authors argue that young states are more likely to rely on foreign law 
because they “have more to learn, and old states have more entrenched practices that are 
harder to change.” Id. at 173. 
140. Id. at 139; Tushnet, supra note 9, at 1289-91.  
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ng) to pause and wonder why 
the United States should be different and whether, when standing alone on a 
legal issue, 
ne? 
The rhetorical role of Issacharov, cast as a groundbreaking decision, and 
f our attention now. 
mise that our holding is not an 
inno
Issacharov took the opposite course: the Court spurned the precedent Meiri 
offered a as a revolutionary departure.142 The Court’s 
American judges citing foreign law already bear a considerable burden to prove 
why the United States, as world leader, should care or follow what others say or 
do. That they should treat other’s law as binding precedent seems unlikely. In 
these circumstances, it may be useful (and humbli
it is on the proper side of the debate.  
IV. TALKING ABOUT A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 
The previous Parts examined why the Israeli Supreme Court turned 
exclusively to the common law in shaping the exclusionary rule and how its 
reliance upon the common law may have led the Court astray in Issacharov. 
But why did the Court frame Issacharov as a revolutionary ruling? Even if 
other common law jurisdictions misled it, why did the Court not rely more 
heavily upon Meiri to make the “creation” of the exclusionary rule seem less 
like the result of judicial activism and more an extension of existing doctri
comparative law’s role in legitimizing it are the focus o
A. Issacharov and Miranda: Revolution or Evolution? 
 Although one of the key characteristics of the common law is the power of 
judges to create and develop law, courts are generally reluctant to frame their 
decisions as revolutionary, and judges usually try to avoid head-on 
confrontations with other branches of government. Rather, courts typically 
claim that their decisions flow from existing precedent or long-established 
principles, even when they introduce significant legal innovations. The United 
States Supreme Court’s opinion in Miranda v. Arizona is a case in point. 
Justice Warren, writing for the Court, began his opinion by stating: “We start 
here, as we did in Escobedo, with the pre
vation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long 
recognized and applied in other settings.”141 
In crafting a highly controversial precedent the Warren Court saw great 
importance in emphasizing its reliance on long-recognized principles. 
nd proclaimed Issacharov 
 
141. 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1965). 
142. The one exception to this observation is Section 49 of the Issacharov decision, in 
which the Court notes that Issacharov should not be regarded as an “unexpected revolution” 
in evidence law but rather “an additional step in a gradual process.” However, this section 
seems at odds with the decision’s general focus on the Constitutional Revolution, its effect 
on evidence law, and the new balance created between crime control and due process. 
Section 49 may be viewed as an attempt to tone down the revolutionary rhetoric of the rest 
of the decision in an effort to avoid criticism. It is noteworthy that within that same section 
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choice to formulate Issacharov as groundbreaking should come as an even 
greater surprise considering that since 1999, six proposals to recognize a 
statutory exclusionary rule have failed to win the Knesset’s approval.143 The 
heavy criticism of the Israeli Supreme Court for its judicial activism would 
seem to present sufficient motivation to frame Issacharov as a direct derivative 
of Meiri and within the boundaries of existing doctrine, rather than presenting it 
as a creation of the Barak Court. 
A number of attributes of Issacharov hint at why the Supreme Court 
framed its opinion so boldly. Issacharov supplied a much-awaited opportunity 
for the Barak Court to establish its legacy and write another chapter of the 
Constitutional Revolution as applied to the procedural rights of criminal 
defendants.  
B. How Easy Cases Can Make Bad Law 
As discussed in Part I, Issacharov dealt with illegal possession and use of 
marijuana by an IDF soldier. Although criminal offenses tend to be treated 
more severely when committed during an individual’s military service, Israeli 
law (and society) does not regard marijuana use or possession as grave crimes. 
First offenses frequently go unpunished and are often not even prosecuted for 
lack of public interest.144 The maximum sentence for drug use in Israel is three 
years’ imprisonment,145 a penalty that is usually reserved for possession or use 
of more potent drugs. In Issacharov, the defendant was sentenced by the trial 
court to two months’ probation that would be deemed violated only if he 
committed an additional offense under the Drug Ordinance during the course of 
the next eighteen months.146  
And according to the Supreme Court’s own account, by the time the Court 
rendered its decision on Issacharov’s appeal, the case had become moot. The 
 
the Court goes on to explain that although the Court had recognized its power to exclude 
evidence before Issacharov, it refrained from doing so until the Basic Laws were passed, 
once again emphasizing the innovation of the decision and the Constitutional Revolution’s 
effect on this issue. According to the Court, it was the passage of the Basic Laws which 
provided the “impetus for reexamining the question.” See CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. 
Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] (not yet published), § 49, available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/98/210/051/n21/98051210.n21.pdf.  
143. Issacharov [2006] § 13 (citing the legislative proposals debated in the Knesset 
thus far). 
144. See Attorney General Guideline No. 4.1105 of Dec. 1, 1985 (updated Sept. 14, 
2003), § 7 (entitled “Prosecution Policy—Drugs: Possession and Personal Use”). The 
prosecutor in Israel holds the discretion not to prosecute offenses due to insufficient 
evidence or lack of public interest. See Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version), 
5742-1982 § 62, 36 LSI 35, 49 (1982) (Isr.); see also RUTH GAVISON, DISCRETION IN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT: THE POWER OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO STAY CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
145 (1991).  
145. Drug Ordinance, 5733-1973, 23 LSI 526 (1973) (Isr.), art. 7(c). 
146. Issacharov [2006] § 5.  
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 decision, the waste of judicial resources 
on a
 
Court began its opinion in Issacharov with an apologia about why the eight-
year time lag between the submission of the appeal and the decision did not 
harm the defendant: since Private Issacharov received only probation, and since 
he had not committed any similar crimes during his probation period, the ruling 
had no effect on his sentence.147 However, this justification cuts both ways in a 
manner which the Court neglected to address: the fact that the defendant 
committed no offense during this period made his conviction for drug use and 
therefore the admissibility of his confession moot.148 In the past the Israeli 
Supreme Court has dismissed cases for being “hypothetical” and therefore 
unworthy of the Court’s consideration and resources.149 Given the length and 
comprehensiveness of the Issacharov
 hypothetical case is stunning. So was there more at stake in Issacharov 
than a conviction for marijuana use? 
The Court’s boldness in Issacharov contrasts strikingly with its reticence in 
another case in which police conduct came to the attention of the Court in a 
motion to suppress evidence. In 2002, while Issacharov was pending, the Court 
faced a far more controversial and consequential matter: the Court delivered a 
ruling admitting the confession of Steven Smirk, charged with membership in a 
terrorist organization and conspiracy to provide information to an enemy.150 
Smirk was a German citizen who converted to Islam, joined Hezbollah, and 
underwent extensive military training in Lebanon. He assisted Hezbollah in 
collecting information and planning a suicide bombing in Israel. During a 
reconnaissance trip to Israel, Smirk was caught and held in preventive arrest, 
147. See id. § 13.  
148. The decision affected only the number of prior convictions for drug use and 
possession in Issacharov’s criminal record.  
149. See HCJ 4827/05 Adam, Teva V’Din v. Minister of the Interior [2005] 
(unpublished). For a discussion of the circumstances under which the Court will nevertheless 
discuss a moot or hypothetical question, see HCJ 6055/95 Tzemach v. Minister of Defense 
[1999] IsrSC 53(5) 241. The Court explained that it would discuss such a case if it raised 
important questions when there is “no practical way for the court to rule on it unless it was 
presented as a general question, unconnected to any particular case.” Id. § 3. In Tzemach the 
Court addressed the validity of a law that allowed a military adjudication officer to order the 
arrest of a lower-ranking soldier who was suspected of committing a crime for a period of up 
to seven days. The Court explained that this question would always become theoretical by 
the time it reached the Court because of the short period of the arrest and the time needed to 
petition the Court and schedule a hearing. The Court explained that the question is “short-
lived . . . it is concrete for just a few days until the soldier is released or brought before a 
military tribunal to extend his arrest . . . . If the Court did not agree to consider the 
constitutionality of the detention, merely because the soldier has been released and the 
petition has become moot, it would never be able to consider the question. The end result 
would be to render the decision to detain soldiers immune from judicial review.” Id. 
However, the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence does not generally raise a similar 
concern of becoming moot by the time it is brought before a court.  
150. CrimA 6613/99 Smirk v. Israel [2002] (unpublished). Justice Beinisch, who wrote 
the Issacharov decision, delivered the opinion of the Court in Smirk as well, making the 
inconsistencies between the two ever more striking.  
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to in
English case raising 
sim  a 
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ce. In the latter case repugnance to torture 
tween the infringement of rights and the 
defe
ned this result, 
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and later stood criminal trial. He was never told of his right to silence. That he 
was denied access to counsel during two weeks of sleep deprivation and 
continuous harsh in
form Smirk of his right to counsel, but denied him counsel in the face of 
repeated demands. 
The Court nonetheless adopted the government’s position that the 
defendant was a “ticking bomb” and therefore the ongoing interrogation, the 
methods of questioning employed, and denial of counsel were necessary and 
legal in barring completion of terrorist activity. Since the actions of the Shin 
Bet, Israel’s Secret Service, were justified on preventive grounds, the Court 
dismissed the defense’s claim that the evidence should be excluded at Smirk’s 
criminal trial—a determination that is all but trivial. In an 
ilar concerns, Lord Nicholls explained why evidence must be excluded in
inal trial even if the acts of the executive are justified: 
The executive and the judiciary have different functions and different 
responsibilities. It is one thing for tainted information to be used by the 
executive when making operational decisions or by the police when exercising 
their investigatory powers, including powers of arrest . . . . It is an altogether 
different matter for the judicial arm of the state to admit such information as 
evidence when adjudicating definitively upon the guilt or innocence of a 
person charged with a criminal offen
demands that proof of facts should be found in more acceptable sources than 
information extracted by torture.151 
Nevertheless, the ruling in Smirk was highly formalistic, accepting the 
lower court findings that sleep deprivation and failure to warn the defendant of 
his rights did not cause the defendant to confess. The case was reduced to a 
factual finding of a causal relation be
ndant’s confession, with no discussion of the underlying normative issues 
that took center stage in Issacharov.  
Still, the Smirk Court did indicate that in appropriate cases denial of rights 
could lead to exclusion of evidence, setting the stage for the Issacharov 
decision. According to the Court, however, Smirk was not the right case for 
such a ruling.152 After all, a principled stance against illegally obtained 
evidence in Smirk would have triggered the acquittal of a self-proclaimed 
terrorist. Israeli public opinion would likely have condem
ecially if the Court presented its exclusionary doctrine as “revolutionary.” 
Acquitting a marijuana smoker was perhaps more palatable. 
151. See A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] UKHL 71 (H.L.) 
(Eng.), § 70. The House of Lords excluded the evidence in that case even though it was 
obtained by officials of a foreign state, and even though the Secretary of State did not seek 
its admission in a criminal trial: the question was the admissibility of such evidence before 
the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC). 
152. See Smirk [2002] § 14. The Court explained that the denial of counsel was legal 
and therefore the core of Smirk’s right to an attorney was not infringed, perhaps only his 
right to appeal this denial.  
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The Court may have reached the correct result in Smirk. Still, there is no 
denying that Smirk presented a far more nuanced dilemma that could have truly 
tested the Supreme Court’s protection of defendants’ rights. A genuinely new 
approach to the exclusionary rule would have led to a drastically different 
opinion, even had the outcome remained the same. In Issacharov the Court held 
that deterring wrongful police conduct is not the sole consideration when 
deciding whether to exclude evidence; courts must consider whether admitting 
the evidence will undermine trial fairness or cause disrepute to the judiciary. 
Smirk would have been a classic case for defining the precise boundaries of 
such a doctrine and balancing between these competing public-policy 
considerations: the severity of Smirk’s crime and the centrality of his 
confession would have weighed in favor of admitting the evidence. On the 
other hand, admitting a confession obtained by questionable interrogation 
methods would certainly call into question the fairness of the trial and bring 
disrepute on the ju
d that the means used were appropriate, necessary, and legal to prevent 
terrorist activity.  
Nevertheless, the Court declined the opportunity to engage in a 
controversial debate concerning the scope of the exclusionary rule. The 
revolution was reserved for Issacharov, a low-stakes case, far less controversial 
or complicated than Smirk, in which the same result could have been reached 
under the existing Meiri doctrine. Easy cases make bad precedents for precisely 
that reason: they avoid the true controversy surrounding the exclusionary rule. 
Such cases give little guidance to lowe
hich courts are asked to exclude key evidence of a severe offense and to 
acquit a dangerous enemy of society.  
Apart from Smirk, in the eight years between the Issacharov hearing and 
decision, the Court faced many other cases in which defense attorneys 
requested the exclusion of evidence due to police misconduct. The Court 
dismissed them all, but emphasized that it would consider excluding such 
evidence in appropriate cases that might present themselves in the future,153 
perhaps referring to Issacharov, which was pending at the time. Why the Court 
delayed decision for so long remains unclear.154 We can only speculate about 
153. See, e.g., CrimA 2180/02 Kassem v. State [2002] IsrSC 57(1) 642, 654; CrimA 
5203/98 Hasson v. Israel [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 274, 283.  
154. The Court attributed the delay to two factors: first, the long period needed to 
study the different facets of the exclusionary rule, its proper scope, and possible foreign 
models; second, the desire to allow the Israeli parliament to consider pending legislative 
proposals on this issue. See CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] 
(not yet published), § 13, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/98/210/051/n21/ 
98051210.n21.pdf. However, as discussed above, the Court could have applied the Meiri 
doctrine to decide this case, reaching the same outcome but avoiding the lengthy study 
which made the case moot. More importantly, relying on Meiri would have allowed the 
Knesset to define the rule as it saw fit. This only strengthens the impression that the Court 
was eager to establish precedent and not defer to the legislature’s judgment. 
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nd were awaiting the retirement of opposing judges; by the time 
Issacharov was decided, six of the nine Justices on the original panel had 
C. U
nt so far as to hint that 
Issa
 
possible causes. Perhaps the Court was waiting for a better “test case” on which 
to establish the new doctrine. Maybe the Court was waiting until it sensed that 
public opinion would support such a move, and through the opinions leading up 
to Issacharov the Court prepared the public for the coming change.155 Perhaps 
the Justices who supported exclusion in Issacharov faced opposition within the 
Court a
retired. 
nfinished Business: Issacharov and the Constitutional Revolution 
The timing of Issacharov suggests that yet another factor may have played 
a role in its selection and formulation as groundbreaking. The decision came 
down almost eight years after the appeal was submitted156 but more 
significantly, only four months before the retirement of Chief Justice Aharon 
Barak, who coined the term “Constitutional Revolution”157 and who dedicated 
much of his career as Chief Justice to expounding the Basic Laws. The timing 
suggests that the Court was eager to render such a precedent, an Israeli 
Miranda, before Barak’s retirement. Issuing the decision during Barak’s tenure 
(albeit at the eleventh hour) helped cement the Barak Court’s status as the 
Israeli Warren Court. Recognizing an exclusionary rule was an important 
component of Barak’s vision of the Constitutional Revolution and its effect on 
criminal law and procedure; he articulated this idea in a 1996 article.158 Other 
legal scholars supported Barak’s vision.159 Some we
charov, pending before the Supreme Court at the time, might provide a 
proper opportunity for developing such a doctrine.160 
Framing Issacharov as a quasi-constitutional doctrine flowing directly 
from the Basic Laws bore symbolic significance: it underscored the importance 
of the exclusionary rule and its status within the Israeli legal system. Exclusion 
155. Posner, supra note 131, at 53 (“[Barak] borrowed from Marshall the trick of first 
announcing a novel rule in a case in which he concludes that the rule does not apply, so that 
people get accustomed to the rule before it begins to bite them.”).  
156. The decision gives us no indication of the precise date in 1998 that the appeal was 
submitted. However, we know from the decision that the Attorney General joined as a 
respondent on September 9, 1998, which means that the appeal was submitted before that 
date. A hearing was held on June 13, 1999, and the Court ruled that the case should be 
decided by a broader panel of nine Justices. (In Israel, most cases are decided by a panel of 
three Justices). Only three of the Justices on the original 1999 panel still served on the Court 
when the decision was rendered in 2006 (Barak, Cheshin, and Beinisch). The remaining six 
Justices were appointed to the Supreme Court after 1999. 
157. See Barak, supra note 86.  
158. See Aharon Barak, The Constitutionalization of Israeli Law: The Basic Laws on 
Human Rights and Criminal Law, 13 BAR-ILAN L. STUD. 5, 24 (1996).  
159. See Gross, supra note 74; Harnon, supra note 22.  
160. Gross, supra note 74, at 150 n.21.  
  
April 2008] DOCTRINES WITHOUT BORDERS 2169 
 the boundaries of the statutory exclusionary rule which the 
Kne
t of the Basic Law brought it one 
step closer towards becoming Israel’s Constitution or Bill of Rights rather than 
n.161  
D. C
hus demonstrated the law-creating power 
of c
 
of illegally obtained evidence would no longer be merely a procedural matter 
but rather a constitutional doctrine. In some respects this elevation placed the 
rule beyond the Knesset’s reach, thus preempting and limiting subsequent 
legislation on the matter. Although this move was not necessary to arrive at the 
result in Issacharov, it did change the status of the exclusionary rule within 
Israel’s pyramid of norms. The Court stripped away much of the legislature’s 
ability to define
sset had been considering. In this regard, Issacharov was indeed 
revolutionary.  
Conversely, placing the exclusionary rule within the purview of Basic 
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty also bolstered the status of the Basic Law 
itself. Issacharov extended the reach of the Basic Law into a new realm, 
emphasizing the Law’s constantly growing scope and its status as a cornerstone 
of Israeli jurisprudence. Such reinforcemen
a weaker quasi-constitutional provisio
omparative Law and Legitimacy 
We have seen why the Court sought out a case like Issacharov to proclaim 
its new doctrine and why it was important to frame the decision as part of the 
Constitutional Revolution. But by framing the decision as revolutionary, the 
Court faced an acute problem of legitimacy and undermined its authority to 
innovate. Creating new doctrines without legislative authorization and in 
seeming defiance of legislative intent is no light matter, especially for a court 
already under attack for its activism. Comparative law addressed this 
legitimacy concern in Issacharov in two ways. First, it showed that courts in 
other common law countries adopted a constitutional exclusionary rule absent 
explicit legislative authorization. It t
ommon law judges in this field and suggested that Israeli judges hold 
inherent authority to do the same.162 
Furthermore, by relying upon the content of the exclusionary rule in other 
common law jurisdictions, the Court justified its new creation as a necessary 
result of international consensus. The Court relied on the reputation of the 
foreign courts cited to make the “old rule” seem outdated, proving that reform 
161. See CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] (not yet 
published), § 54, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/98/210/051/n21/ 
98051210.n21.pdf (“The spirit and principles of the Basic Laws project in varying levels of 
intensity upon all branches of the law and influence basic terms and perceptions therein.”).   
162. For a criticism of Barak’s general approach toward the power of judges to make 
law and its reliance upon the common law, see Posner, supra note 131, at 53-54. This also 
might provide some further explanation of why the Court did not refer to civil law 
jurisdictions, even if the Court was in fact aware that they too had adopted an exclusionary 
rule. 
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able. Casting the decision in this manner enabled the 
Cou
s misguided emulation of another. And it 
may
 judgment’ that murderers 
younger than 18 can never be as morally culpable as older counterparts.”164 
was essential. A judicially spearheaded revolution promised to bring Israel in 
line with similar legal systems. The Supreme Court depicted itself as the 
enlightened branch in contrast to the less progressive legislature. Hence, 
comparative law served largely as a rhetorical tool that made the reform of 
Israeli law appear inevit
rt to present the decision as an Israeli judicial revolution while drawing 
legitimacy from abroad. 
Comparative law in Issacharov served in an interesting double capacity. 
First, it led the Court to the impression that reform was necessary to align 
Israeli law with that of other common law countries (as discussed in Part II). 
Then, in legitimizing the decision, comparative law justified such a revolution. 
These two objectives may seem to conflict: according to the first, comparative 
law is the culprit for potentially misleading judges and causing them to draw 
misguided analogies, whereas under the second, there is nothing inherently 
problematic with comparative law—only its rhetorical use by judges. However, 
these two understandings need not be at odds with each other. Each comes into 
play at a different point within the decision-making process. Nevertheless, the 
role of comparative law in Issacharov highlights two of the dangers inherent in 
its use:  It may prompt one country’
 further serve to justify reform internally in the absence of legislative 
authorization or in defiance thereof. 
The Israeli Supreme Court’s use of comparative law to justify Issacharov 
may seem to illustrate one of the primary dangers against which Scalia, Richard 
Posner, and others who oppose the use of foreign law in the United States have 
cautioned: that comparative law can be used as a rhetorical tool to mask 
personal or political preferences.163 Courts might justify controversial 
decisions through reference to international consensus, making them seem 
more objective and less as a result of their own political or moral convictions. 
As Scalia stated in Roper, what truly drove the Court to deem the execution of 
juveniles unconstitutional was “the court’s ‘own
 
163. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347-48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Beyond the empty talk of a ‘national consensus,’ the Court gives us a brief glimpse of 
what really underlies today’s decision: pretension to a power confined neither by the moral 
sentiments originally enshrined in the Eighth Amendment (its original meaning) nor even by 
the current moral sentiments of the American people . . . . The arrogance of this assumption 
of power takes one’s breath away.”). Scalia goes on to talk of the “contrived consensus” 
which the Court has found. Id.; see also Richard Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term: 
Forward: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 85, 88 (2005) (“The search for such a 
consensus is an effort to ground controversial Supreme Court judgments in something more 
objective than the Justices’ political preferences and thus to make the Court’s political 
deci ense of the 
word
ssenting). 
sions seem less political . . . it is a ‘rhetorical’ move in the pejorative s
.”).  
164. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 615 (2005) (Scalia, J., di
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Sca
lthough typical of comparative 
law
hould value comparative law as a source of foreign 
wisdom and experience.    
C  
v doctrine from Meiri despite their identical 
lia dismissed the Court’s comparative rhetoric as “sophistry.”165 
But such fears of misuse need not lead to a generally dismissive approach 
towards using comparative law in judicial decision making. As Tushnet has 
pointed out correctly, Posner and Scalia’s criticism on this count confounds 
(perhaps justified) criticism of the ends to which comparative law is employed 
with (unwarranted) criticism of the means. If Scalia and Posner are correct that 
their counterparts wear comparative law as a façade, it is not comparative law 
that should be blamed, but the end to which it is put by judges—to mask their 
personal or political preferences. This criticism of comparative law feeds on 
other critiques of judicial decision making and a
, is neither unique not inherent in its use.166 
One need not dismiss all use of comparative law just because it bears the 
potential of misuse. Even those who support the use of comparative law have 
proceeded on the assumption that it is not being used rhetorically.167 
Obviously, determining when it is being used rhetorically is itself controversial 
and may be influenced by one’s opinion of the outcome reached by the court. 
But the potential for judicial misuse cannot justify abandonment of an 
interpretive tool without requiring abandonment of all rules of construction. 
Instead we should be wary of the typical misuses to which comparative law is 
prone and the unique dangers it carries, some of which I have addressed here. 
With due warning, courts s
ONCLUSION
The Israeli Supreme Court’s revolutionary rhetoric will most likely mark 
Issacharov as one of the groundbreaking decisions of the Barak Court era. Due 
to its branding as innovative, Issacharov will be remembered by future 
generations as Israel’s Miranda while the Meiri decision, which reached an 
essentially identical outcome, will soon be forgotten. Within Israel, Issacharov 
is an important omen of what is to come after the retirement of Chief Justice 
Barak: Issacharov has reaffirmed the Beinisch Court’s commitment to the 
Constitutional Revolution of the Barak era. It remains to be seen what shape 
this Revolution will take under Beinisch’s leadership and what reactions it 
might provoke from other branches of government. Also uncertain is 
Issacharov’s impact on lower-court rulings in Israel and on the Supreme 
Court’s own application of the exclusionary rule. Will Issacharov in fact result 
in the exclusion of more evidence than Meiri? Will the Court be able in the 
future to distinguish the Issacharo
 
165. Id. at 627 (“To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking and 
ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking but sophistry.”).  
166. See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 1280-81.  
167. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 139, at 137.  
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atte
 must maintain the proper distance between self and other: 
we 
 may lead to a better understanding of ourselves. 
By looking in the comparative mirror we are forced to see who we are and 
determine what values we hold dear, why we are different and why, in some 
cases, we ought to remain so. 
operation in a unitary judiciary?   
Issacharov also bears broader implications which are relevant beyond the 
borders of Israel. The decision demonstrates some of the risks of using 
comparative law and of transplanting foreign doctrines: the futility of precisely 
replicating doctrines across borders and the dangers of false analogies whe
mpting to do so. Issacharov also underscores the risks of emulation, of 
regarding comparative law as binding precedent, and of courts using 
comparative law as a rhetorical tool for legitimizing controversial decisions.  
Nevertheless, the questionable fashion in which comparative law was 
employed in Issacharov should not deter us from examining the experience of 
other nations and learning from them whenever possible. Comparative law has 
an important role to play in formulating new rules and doctrines and in 
interpreting old ones, in Israel and elsewhere. Comparative law, like history, 
can save us from repeating the mistakes of others. We may all benefit from 
both the positive and negative experiences of other jurisdictions. However, 
when doing so we
must remember the differences between ourselves and the source from 
which we borrow, and account for factors that might stretch or snap the 
analogies drawn.  
Although Issacharov demonstrates why one cannot expect to replicate 
legal doctrines precisely or “transplant” them, engagement with foreign texts 
and ideas can still enrich and inform our ideas for approaching and solving 
common problems. But rather than seeing foreign law as a model to mimic we 
must use it to start a conversation between equals. Adopted doctrines must be 
adapted to suit local conditions, while accounting for factors that might 
influence their operation. And even if we choose not to adopt the laws of 
others, simply examining them
